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Comments
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS: A
JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY OF EXISTING LIMITATION
DEVICES AND PROPOSAL BASED ON AN
ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE VERSUS
SUBJECTIVE INDICES OF DISTRESS
The case law in the field here treated is in an almost unpar-
alleled state of confusion and any attempt at a consistent exege-
sis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed
perplexity. Early attempts by the courts to deal with the ques-
tions were complicated by the lack of any adequate body of
legal authorities as well as by the inadequacy of the factual or
scientific information available.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment begins by reviewing the evolution of limiting princi-
ples, and the policy issues which gave rise to them, in the area of negli-
gent infliction of mental distress.2 A survey of jurisdictions following
each of the tests and requirements is provided,3 and some of the
problems that these jurisdictions face in administering the various rules
are discussed. Difficulties with the arbitrary nature of these restrictions
are considered in terms of barring recovery to reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs who sustain serious injury and in terms of allowing recovery in
noncompelling situations.
Subsequently, this Comment advocates an approach adopted by a
few courts and commentators which shifts the focus of the analysis from
1. Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Conse-
quences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103
(1959) (footnotes omitted).
2. For further discussion of the evolution of the common law in the area of
negligent infliction of mental distress, see generally Comment, Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Liability for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Distress, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291, 293-98 (1981) (tracing evolution of "physical im-
pact," "physical manifestation," "zone of danger," "Dillon" and general foresee-
ability analyses); Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 848-64 (1981)
(same).
3. For a discussion of the jurisdictions following the varying tests and re-
quirements, see infra notes 59-75 (physical impact), 91 (zone of danger and
physical manifestation), 92 (zone of danger), 139, 145-46 (Dillon), 186-96 (gen-
eral foreseeability) and accompanying text.
(781)
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the duty element of the cause of action to that of proximate cause.4 A
proposal is offered which defines foreseeable injury as that proportion
of subjective distress which is factually connected to the objective sever-
ity of the stressor. That proportion of injury which is accounted for by
intrapsychic, predisposing influences is submitted to be both unforesee-
able from the perspective of the defendant and factually unconnected to
the tortious event.
It is submitted that foreseeable injury should be qualified or de-
scribed through recourse to traumatic stress theory in psychology. Indi-
viduals who are exposed to traumatic events go through predictable and
phasic paths of recovery. The length and scope of such a recovery pe-
riod in a "normally constituted individual" may be defined as foresee-
able, while unique intrapsychic events which interrupt the recovery
process may be seen as nonculpable.
Finally, this proposed analysis is assessed both in terms of the tradi-
tional policy concerns for limiting the potential liability of defendants
and avoiding the successful litigation of fraudulent claims, 5 and in terms
of a proposed additional focus on how best to compensate plaintiffs. It
is submitted that where the subjective level of stress experienced by the
plaintiff exceeds the objective level of severity of the stressor, then the
very process of litigation will be most likely to exacerbate the plaintiff's
damages. 6
II. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF EXISTING REQUIREMENTS
A. Parasitic Recovery-An Analysis of Social Policy
Traditionally, mental distress has been compensable only as a para-
sitic 7 damage arising from the violation of another independently recog-
4. For a discussion of this proposition, which focusses on a foreseeable in-jury rather than a foreseeable plaintiff, see infra notes 228-34 and accompanying
text.
5. For a discussion of the policy concerns traditionally offered in this area
of law, see infra notes 16-18, 42-50 and accompanying text.
6. This proposition is the topic of a doctoral dissertation currently being
conducted by the author.
7. See, e.g., Annotation, supra note 1, at 106-07 (traditionally, mental distress
compensable only as parasitic upon another tort such as trespass, injury to repu-
tation, invasion of privacy, physical injury or false imprisonment). As a result of
this legal status, plaintiffs who suffered invasion of their mental tranquility were
afforded only indirect protection. See, e.g., Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress: The Caseforan Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237, 1238 n.8 (1971) [here-
inafter Comment, Independent Tort].
Legal scholars have noted that that which is parasitic today, may be recog-
nized as an independent basis of liability tomorrow. Such damages may merely
be part of a "transitory stage of legal evolution." See Comment, Duty, Foreseeabil-
ity, and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 ME. L. REV. 303, 306 n.15
(1981) (hereinafter Comment, Foreseeability]; Annotation, supra note 1, at 106 n.4;
see also Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 347, 36 S.E.2d
782 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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nized protected interest. 8 The most common example of such parasitic
recovery has been in actions for negligent infliction of physical injury.
Mental distress has long been a recognized element of damages for
"pain and suffering." 9
Illustrative of this notion is the New York Court of Appeals' then
landmark decision in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway. '0 In Mitchell, the plain-
tiff, a pregnant woman, was nearly struck by a horse-drawn carriage
which was negligently operated by an agent of the defendant. " As the
result of her fright and excitement, the plaintiff became unconscious and
suffered a miscarriage and consequent illness. 12 The court held that
fright alone could not form the basis of a legally cognizable action, and
thus, subsequent physical harm resulting from that initial fright was
noncompensable. 13 Specifically, the court held that no recovery was
available for injuries sustained by fright absent a contemporaneous
physical injury.' 4 This principle became known as the "physical impact"
requirement. ' 5
475, 478 (1945) (various theories of recovery for infliction of mental distress
illustrate current phase of evolution of common law).
8. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 924, 616 P.2d
813, 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1980) (status of parasitic recovery was neces-
sary to assure validity of claim); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 548, 553,
437 N.E.2d 171, 176, 179 (1982) (mental distress traditionally parasitic to physi-
cal injury); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 75, 451 N.E.2d 759, 763 (1983)
(courts traditionally allowed only parasitic recovery to provide assurance of va-
lidity of claim).
This notion has continued vitality in a few jurisdictions to the present day.
See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 273-74, 596 S.W.2d 681, 684, 685
(1980) (no damages for mental distress available absent independent cause of
action, physical injury or extreme and outrageous conduct by defendant);
Wishard Memorial Hosp. v. Logwood, 512 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (damages for mental distress available only for physical injury, false im-
prisonment or assault; invasion of such legal rights, by its nature, likely to pro-
voke emotional disturbance); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 875, 686 P.2d
112, 118 (1984) (physical injury resulting from mental distress not required for
intentional misconduct by defendant such as assault, false arrest or slander).
For a discussion of those jurisdictions which continue to require an antece-
dent physical impact in order to recover damages for mental distress, see infra
notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., McCarthy, Illinois Law in Distress: The "Zone of Danger" and "Physi-
cal Injuy" Rules in Emotional Distress Litigation, 19J. MAR. L. REV. 17, 23 (1985)
(where defendant causes physical injury to plaintiff, damages for emotional dis-
tress have been, and continue to be, recoverable as pain and suffering).
10. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
11. 151 N.Y. at 108, 45 N.E. at 354. The plaintiff stood between the heads
of the horses when they were finally brought to a stop. Id. at 108, 45 N.E. at 354.
12. Id. at 108-09, 45 N.E. at 354. Medical testimony suggested that the
mental shock the plaintiff received from the incident was sufficient to produce
these results. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
15. For discussions and critical analyses of the physical impact rule, see Mc-
1988]
3
Marlowe: Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In denying recovery, the Mitchell court relied on a series of policy
concerns which have continued in vitality, though not without contro-
versy and criticism.' 6 The court stated that to allow recovery for mere
fright, unaccompanied by antecedent or contemporaneous physical in-
jury, would 1) result in a flood of litigation, 2) risk the successful prose-
cution of fraudulent claims and 3) expose defendants to potentially
unlimited liability.' 7 The court feared that
[i]f the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once
established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in
cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned
without detection, and where damages must rest upon mere
conjecture or speculation . . . . To establish such a doctrine
would be contrary to principles of public policy. 18
Alternatively, the court held that the plaintiff's damages were not
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. 19 The court reasoned
that proximate damages were those which naturally, ordinarily and
foreseeably result from a culpable act.2 0 Here, the court held that the
injury resulted from an unusual combination of circumstances which the
defendant could not anticipate, and over which he had no control. 2 1
The Mitchell court's proximate cause rationale does not hold up
under close analysis. If, as the court asserted, the limiting principle for
proximate causality is the degree of foreseeability of the harm suffered,
then it may be argued that emotional distress is a foreseeable result of
such a near collision.2 2 Further, as Dean Prosser has noted, the deter-
Carthy, supra note 9, at 23-24; Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 7, at 1239-
40; Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Recognized
Tort Action, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 557, 558-60 (1984); Comment, Foreseeability, supra
note 7, at 306-08.
16. For a discussion of the social policy factors advanced in favor of restric-
tions on recovery in the area of negligent infliction of mental distress, see gener-
ally McCarthy, supra note 9, at 20-2 1; Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 7, at
1244-45; Note, supra note 2, at 850-53.
17. Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89
(1897) (psychic alarm resulting in physical illness is natural result of exposure to
danger) (For further discussion of the Spade court's criticism of the Mitchell prox-
imate cause analysis, see infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.), overruled on
other grounds, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); see
also Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322-23 (1896)
(abandoning physical impact requirement because fright resulting in physical in-jury is natural and foreseeable result of exposure to danger). The court in Sloane
stated:
The interdependence of the mind and body is in many respects so close
that it is impossible to distinguish their respective influence upon each
784 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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mination that a particular result is not foreseeable actually reflects a
rough sense of "justice," rather than a precise legal standard:
Direct causation, the scope of the risk, the unforeseeable plain-
tiff, the last human wrongdoer, the distinction between cause
and condition, limitations of time and space, substantial fac-
tors, natural and probable consequences, mechanical systems
of multiple rules, and all the rest of the rigmarole of "proxi-
mate cause," all have been tried and found wanting in situa-
tions that inevitably arise to which they do not and cannot
provide a satisfactory solution. There is no substitute for deal-
ing with the particular facts, and considering all the factors that
bear on them, interlocked as they must be.
What we are left with is at most an approach to the prob-
lem, an attitude, a beginning-a vague, rough and general
statement of what we are looking for.[ 23 ]
Mitchell's foreseeability analysis with regard to proximate causation
was met with criticism almost from the outset. In Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R.R. ,24 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the physical
impact requirement, but refused to base its analysis on grounds of prox-
imate cause.2 5 In Spade, the plaintiff suffered severe nervous shock after
witnessing an agent of the defendant railroad forcibly remove an intoxi-
cated passenger from the car.26 The court held that the natural result of
such danger is psychic alarm, and that strong emotion, mediated by the
action of the nervous and circulatory systems, produces physical re-
suits. 2 7 Presumably, the court felt that such a generalized human re-
sponse could not, as a matter of law, be deemed unforeseeable. 28
other.... It is a matter of general knowledge that an attack of sudden
fright, or an exposure to imminent peril, has produced in individuals a
complete change in their nervous system, and rendered one who was
physically strong and vigorous weak and timid .... If these nerves, or
the entire nervous system, are thus affected, there is a physical injury
thereby produced; and, if the primal cause of this injury is tortious, it is
immaterial whether it is direct, as by a blow, or indirect, through some
action upon the mind.
Id. at 680, 44 P. at 322-23.
23. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1953).
24. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88, overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass.
555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
25. 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89.
26. Id. at 285, 47 N.E. at 89.
27. Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 88.
28. This recognition that psychic injury is a natural and foreseeable re-
sponse to nonphysical environmental trauma has been echoed by many courts in
their efforts to expand the scope of protection for the infliction of mental dis-
tress. Perhaps the most cogent description of the expectable human reaction to
psychic distress may be found in Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 411-12, 520
P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974):
19881
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In addition to asserting the reasonable degree of foreseeability of
psychic harm, the Spade court stated:
The exemption from liability [for psychic distress unaccompa-
nied by antecedent physical impact] does not rest on the as-
sumption that these do not constitute an actual injury. They do
in fact deprive one of enjoyment and of comfort, cause real suf-
fering, and to a greater or lesser extent disqualify one for the
time being from doing the duties of life.[29]
Thus, the court implicitly avoided a policy determination that allowing
such claims would lead to the prosecution of fraudulent actions. 30
Rather, the court relied solely on the policy concern for exposing de-
fendants to unlimited liability, and the fear that the judicial system could
not practically administer any other rule to justly allocate the burdens
between the parties. 3 '
Traumatic stimulus may cause two types of mental reaction, pri-
mary and secondary. The primary response, an immediate, automatic
and instinctive response designed to protect an individual from harm,
unpleasantness and stress . . . is exemplified by emotional responses
such as fear, anger, grief, and shock. This initial response, which is
short in duration and subjective in nature, will vary in seriousness ac-
cording to the individual and the particular traumatic stimulus.
Secondary responses, which may be termed traumatic neuroses,
are longer-lasting reactions caused by an individual's continued inabil-
ity to cope adequately with a traumatic event. Medical science has iden-
tified three frequently occurring forms of neuroses resulting from
trauma. [These are:] the anxiety reaction .... the conversion reaction
.... [and] the hypochondriasis reaction ....
Id. For a description of the current diagnostic criteria for the "secondary reac-
tions" alluded to by the Leong court, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 235-45, 247-53,
257-67 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
29. Spade, 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at 88.
30. Id. The court stated that "recovery therefor cannot be denied on the
ground that the injury is fanciful and not real." Id.
31. Id. at 288-89, 47 N.E. at 89. The court stated: "[R]ules of law respect-
ing the recovery of damages are framed with reference to the rights of both
parties; not merely what it might be right for an injured person to receive.., but
also what it is just to compel the other party to pay." Id.
It is unfortunate that the Spade court, after acknowledging the foreseeability
and substantiality of mental damages, chose the impact rule as a method of allo-
cating burdens according to its intuitive sense of fairness. The court appeared
most troubled by the facts of the case, in which the plaintiff suffered severe emo-
tional upset from viewing an altercation from a distance. See id. at 289, 47 N.E.
at 89. Had the court differentiated between the degree of foreseeability of dis-
tress resulting from an objectively traumatic experience, and that resulting from
the facts of the instant case, it could have preserved its proximate cause analysis
without recourse to the impact requirement. For a discussion of this author's
proposal for measuring foreseeable injury by a comparison of objective versus
subjective indices of distress, see infra notes 238-82 and accompanying text. See
also Annotation, supra note 1, at 103 (noting tendency of early court decisions to
lay out rules and principles broader than required by facts of cases).
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In addition to reliance on the element of proximate cause, several
courts which adopted the impact requirement have concluded that in the
absence of such an impact, the defendant owes no duty of due care to the
plaintiff. For example, in Haile's Curator v. Texas & Pacific Railway,3 2 the
plaintiff and his brother had boarded the defendant's train for a pleasure
trip on the advice of a physician because the brother had been depressed
and nervous following an attack of grippe.3 3 The train caught fire, and
the plaintiff and his brother barely escaped.3 4 Subsequently, the relief
train which was sent to convey the stranded passengers was itself in-
volved in an accident. 35 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of these
incidents, his brother required commitment to an insane asylum, with
little or no hope of recovery.3 6 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant had reason to anticipate that its
train accidents would cause physical injury, and would produce fright
and excitement. However, the court held that the defendant had no rea-
son to anticipate that the latter would result in a permanent mental disa-
bility.3 7 Rather than concluding its analysis with this apparent
proximate cause holding that the injury was unforeseeable from the per-
spective of the defendant, the court stated that since the plaintiff suf-
fered no bodily impact, the defendant owed him no duty to protect him
from fright or excitement.3 8
The Haile's court's analysis of legal duty also appears to be concep-
tually erroneous. The existence of a legal duty is typically framed in
terms of whether the defendant reasonably should have foreseen that his
or her conduct risked harm to the particular plaintiff.39 It is difficult to
understand how a court could conclude that the administrator of a rail-
road could not have foreseen injury to its passengers in the event of a
collision or fire. As Dean Prosser has noted, the existence of a legal duty
often merely states the conclusion that a court will recognize and pro-
32. 60 F. 557 (5th Cir. 1894).
33. Id. at 557.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 558.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 560. In effect, by saying that fright and physical injury was fore-
seeable from the perspective of the defendant, while insanity was not, the court
was indicating that defendants should not be held liable for peculiar predisposi-
tions of plaintiffs. For a discussion of the "thin skull" rule, which renders dam-
ages to predisposed individuals a priori foreseeable, and thus compensable, see
infra notes 210-27 and accompanying text. For a discussion of this author's pro-
posal that predisposition be characterized as unforeseeable injury, see infra
notes 238-82 and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(1928). The Palsgraf court stated: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines
the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension." Id.
1988] COMMENT 787
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vide redress for a particular injury to a particular plaintiff.40 This analy-
sis by Dean Prosser has been repeatedly echoed by courts in their efforts
to expand recovery in the area of negligent infliction of mental
distress .
4 1
The social policies advanced in favor of the physical impact rule
have been the subject of much criticism.42 The concern over a resulting
flood of litigation has simply not materialized in those jurisdictions
which have liberalized recovery in this area. 43 Further, courts and com-
mentators have strongly asserted that concerns for judicial expediency
are insufficient to stand in the way of redress to injured plaintiffs. 44 In
40. Prosser, supra note 23, at 15-16. Dean Prosser stated:
These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if
the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we
make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that
there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential ques-
tion. When we find a duty, breach and damage, everything has been
said. The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the
obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal
sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether
or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our
ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the
rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the end
the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores
of the community .... It needs no argument to show that duty does
not always coincide with the foreseeable risk.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Dean Prosser's assertion that "proxi-
mate cause" represents a conclusion based upon social policy, see supra note 23
and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 76 (1968) ("duty" represents sum total of policy considerations) (cit-
ing W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 353 (3d ed. 1964)); Ramirez v. Arm-
strong, 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983) (duty connotes obligation
to which law will give recognition and effect; it is often couched in terms of
foreseeability) (citing W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS, §§ 43, 53 (4th ed.
1971)); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 166, 404 A.2d 672, 682 (1979) (duty repre-
sents "reductions of the multi-faceted mores of the community") (quoting W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971)).
42. See generally Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 307-8 (discussing
and criticizing traditional policy justifications in this area).
43. See, e.g., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 656, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (1979)
(fear of flood of litigation has not materialized in jurisdictions expanding recov-
ery); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 542, 673 P.2d 822, 826 (1983)
(same); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 133, 447 N.E.2d 109,
111 (1983) (expressing doubts that problem of increased litigation is real, and if
real, would be unacceptable reason for "denying justice").
As an empirical matter, the volume of litigation may actually be heaviest in
states which apply the impact rule, presumably due to increased appellate view
of efforts to expand recovery or mark out exceptions to the rule. See Niederman
v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 411,261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970) (citing Lambert, Tort Liabil-
ity for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. REV. 584, 592 (1961)).
44. See, e.g., Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18-19 (Fla. 1985) (price of
discernible physical injury, caused by psychic trauma, too great to require physi-
cal contact); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 133, 447 N.E.2d
109, 111 (1983) (increased litigation is unacceptable reason for "denying jus-
[Vol. 33: p. 781788
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fact, some courts consider themselves to be under a state constitutional
obligation to provide a forum for redress of personal injury.45
Additionally, many courts have denied that a fear of fraudulent liti-
gation should effect the availability of recovery as a threshold matter.
Rather, such concerns can best be addressed as a matter of proof at
trial. 46 The existence and extent of mental distress is no longer gener-
ally viewed as so substantially different from, and easier to feign than,
physical injury as to require qualitatively different rules of recovery. 4 7
This change in perception reflects, in part, an increasing judicial notice
and acceptance of the advances in the medical and behavioral
sciences.
48
tice"); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986) (if only purpose of
law is to unburden court system, should simply close district courts).
45. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454,463, 210 A.2d 709, 714
(1965) (abandoning physical impact rule because "[plart of our basic law is the
mandate that 'every man for an injury done him in his ... person ... shall have
remedy by the due course of law..'") (quoting DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9); Mazza-
gatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 289, 516 A.2d 672, 684 (1986) (Papadakos,J.,
dissenting) (arguing for recovery to relatives of person injured through defend-
ant's negligence without requirement that plaintiff contemporaneously view inci-
dent) (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 11); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197-98
(Wyo. 1986) (abandoning physical impact rule, noting that " '[a]ll courts shall be
open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall
have justice administered without sale, denial or delay' ") (quoting Wyo. CONST.
art. I, § 8).
46. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 735, 441 P.2d 912, 917, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 77 (1968) (concern that juries cannot reconcile expert testimony or
distinguish deceitful from bona fide claims is doubtful factual assumption);
Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 134, 447 N.E.2d 109, 112
(1983) (problem is one of adequate proof, and judicial system and evidentiary
safeguards sufficient to address this); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 161, 404 A.2d
672, 680 (1979) ("Factual, legal, and medical charlatans are unlikely to emerge
from a trial unmasked") (quoting Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 410-11,
261 A.2d 84, 88-89 (1970)).
47. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 924, 616 P.2d
813, 817-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835-39 (1980) (border between physical and
psychic injury not clearly delineated).
48. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In an
oft-cited decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that "[i]n judging the
genuineness of a claim of mental distress, courts and juries may look to 'the
quality and genuineness of proof and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistica-
tion of the medical profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out dis-
honest claims.' " Id. at 172, 472 P.2d at 519-20 (quoting Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5
N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958)) (emphasis added); accord
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980) ("With the rise of modern psychology the basis of
this caution [regarding difficulties of proof] in securing an important element of
the interest of personality was removed.").
In many jurisdictions, the courts will look to the context and circumstances
of the case to assess the genuineness of the claim where the distress is not sus-
ceptible to scientific certainty. See, e.g., Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 686
P.2d 209, 213 (Mont. 1984) (tortious conduct must result in substantial invasion
of protected interest and cause significant emotional impact on plaintiff); Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 168, 404 A.2d 672. 683 (1979) (requiring showing that nor-
1988]
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The concern for exposing defendants to potentially unlimited liabil-
ity, and thus, placing too onerous a burden on defendants' beneficial
activity, has been the most lasting policy limitation on actions for mental
distress. 49 As Dean Prosser notes:
There is still the problem of an end to liability, of a place to
stop. It is still unthinkable that any one shall be liable to the
end of time for all of the results that follow in endless sequence
from his single act. Causation cannot be the answer; in a very
real sense the consequences of an act go forward to eternity,
and back to the beginning of the world. Any attempt to impose
responsibility on such a basis would result in infinite liability for
all wrongful acts, which would "set society on edge and fill the
courts with endless litigation."[ 50 ]
Aside from the issue of whether these policy limitations are valid
concerns in limiting causes of action for mental distress, much criticism
has been levelled at the physical impact requirement as not even prop-
erly addressing these concerns.5 1 It has been recognized, for example,
that the rule is both underinclusive and overinclusive; recovery is denied
in cases involving severe and objectively verifiable psychic trauma, and is
mally constituted individual could not adequately cope with stress engendered
by defendant's conduct) (citing Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 186, 472 P.2d
509, 519-20 (1970)). But see Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo.
1983) (en banc) (requiring "medically diagnosable" and "medically significant"
emotional injury).
49. See Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 308 (noting that liability
should not extend ad infinitum, but arguing that impact rule is arbitrary re-
sponse to this problem); see also Strickland v. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 911,
216 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1975) (requiring physical impact on "pragmatic" ground
of limiting scope of liability); Wishard Memorial Hosp. v. Logwood, 512 N.E.2d
1126, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
This concern has been expressed most strenuously with regard to whether
to allow recovery to plaintiffs who witness injury to a third party. See, e.g., Pear-
son, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the
Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. F"A. L. REV. 477 (1982) (asserting that arbitrary
limitations on liability are necessary for competing policy reasons). Compare Dil-
lon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (requiring
concrete guidelines for determining foreseeability of harm to bystander plaintiff
so as to limit otherwise potentially infinite liability) with Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969) (denying recovery to by-
standers because once allowed, could extend liability to too many individuals;
burdensome liability is "dollars-and-cents argument"). For a discussion of Dil-
lon and its progeny, see infra notes 121-33, 139, 145-46 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Tobin, see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
50. Prosser, supra note 23, at 24 (citations omitted).
51. For criticisms of the physical impact rule, see generally Liebson, Recov-
ery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L.
163, 168-72 (1976-77); Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 7, at 1239-40;
Comment, supra note 15, at 558-60; Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 307-
09.
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available for minor distress following a negligible impact. 5 2 Further, in
an effort to reach equitable results, courts have stretched the facts ap-
preciably so as to find a physical impact where the plaintiff suffered se-
vere but otherwise noncompensable emotional injury.53 Since the sole
purpose of the rule was to limit the number of potential actions and to
assure the legitimacy of the claims, the courts did not always require a
causal connection between the impact and the emotional distress. 54
A frequently cited example of this proposition is the case of Zelinsky
v. Chimics,5 5 in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court awarded damages
to the plaintiffs solely for their emotional distress following an automo-
bile accident. The court noted that the plaintiffs sustained no physical
injuries, but held that the jarring and jostling caused by the collision was
sufficient physical impact. 56 The court stated:
[T]he purpose of the rule requiring physical impact is to pre-
vent "illusory or imaginative or faked" claims. However, where
it is definitely established that injury and suffering were proxi-
mately caused by an act of negligence, and any degree of physi-
52. For an example of this proposition, compare Woodman v. Dever, 367
So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (child who witnessed robbery and sexual
assault of mother denied recovery because no physical impact on child) with
Wilson v. Redken Laboratories, 562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978) (awarding $30,000
for humiliation and distress resulting from loss of hair due to defective condi-
tioner). For this author's proposal that recovery be based upon an analysis of
objective versus subjective indices of distress, see infra notes 238-82 and accom-
panying text.
53. See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 275, 596 S.W.2d 681,
685-86 (1980) (noting tendency in Arkansas to find "constructive impact" from
such facts as laying of hands on plaintiff or threats of restraint); Eagle-Picher
Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (inhalation of
asbestos fibers); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980) (X-ray bom-
bardment); Stoddard v. Davidson, 355 Pa. Super. 262, 266, 513 A.2d 419, 422
(1986) (jarring, jostling and lurching of car resulting from running over corpse
left in road). But see Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340,
347-48, 36 S.E.2d 475, 479 (1945) (slight cut on face insufficient impact to sup-
port recovery for post-traumatic psychoneurosis following car accident; bodily
suffering and mental pain must show natural connection or be inseparable).
54. See, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 553, 457 N.E.2d
1, 4 (1983) ("The requirement of impact often became purely formal, and it was
satisfied by a slight jolt or jar or any degree of physical 'impact,' however
slight.") (citation omitted); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 559, 380
N.E.2d 1295, 1297-98 (1978) (once physical injury established, damages result-
ing solely from nervous shock recoverable despite lack of causal connection);
Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 307-08 (impact rule no longer distin-
guishes legitimate from illegitimate claims because it has evolved to allow recov-
ery for slightest impact).
55. 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961). The factual determination in
this case is no longer important in Pennsylvania since the impact rule has been
abandoned. See Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (adopt-
ing a zone-of-danger test), modified, Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672
(1979) (allowing recovery to bystanders not within the zone of danger).
56. Zelinsky, 196 Pa. Super. at 318, 175 A.2d at 354.
1988]
11
Marlowe: Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33: p. 781
cal impact, however slight, can be shown, the general rule is no
longer applicable .... [57]
1. Current Status of the Physical Impact Requirement
Despite the more recent trend to discard the physical impact re-
quirement, 58 it remains the primary recovery limitation device for
mental distress actions in a few jurisdictions. 59 Some of the difficulties
57. Id. (citing Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958)).
58. See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 n.l (Wyo. 1986) (list of ju-
risdictions abrogating the impact rule); Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 7,
at 1240.
For a discussion of those jurisdictions granting recovery to plaintiffs who
are in imminent apprehension of physical harm, see infra notes 91-92 and ac-
companying text. For those jurisdictions granting recovery to bystanders of in-
jury to another person, see infra notes 139, 145-46 and accompanying text. For
those jurisdictions utilizing a general foreseeable plaintiff analysis, see infra
notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
59. Arkansas: See Lou v. Smith, 284 Ark. 249, 685 S.W.2d 809 (1985)
(mother of child injured by taking adult dosage of medication must show willful
misconduct by pharmacist to recover for mental distress absent physical impact
to mother); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980) (no
action for mental distress absent physical injury, independent cause of action or
willful misconduct by defendant).
District of Columbia: See Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1929) (nervous condition flowing from emotional shock of car accident,
rather than from physical impact, held noncompensable); Asuncion v. Columbia
Hosp. for Women, 514 A.2d 1187, 1188-89 (D.C. 1986) (bloody gauze left in
vagina after childbirth was insufficient physical impact); District of Columbia v.
Smith, 436 A.2d 1294, 1296 (D.C. 1981) (negligent failure to inform next of kin
about death of loved one noncompensable absent physical impact).
Georgia: See Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916)
(mother who was physically injured while attempting to escape oncoming train
stated cause of action; in absence of such impact, mother could not recover for
shock resulting from witnessing mangling of child); Sanders v. Brown, 178 Ga.
App. 447, 343 S.E.2d 722 (family members who witnessed minor being sprayed
with insecticide barred from recovery absent physical impact), cert. denied, 178
Ga. 447 (1986); Howard v. Bloodworth, 137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122
(1976) (son who learned of mother's death barred from recovery); Strickland v.
Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1975) (parents who learned of seri-
ous injuries sustained by daughter barred from recovery; "pragmatic reasoning"
related to limiting liability of defendants dictates such a rule).
Indiana: See Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326
(1945) (man whose car was struck and dragged by train stated cause of action for
purely emotional damages despite fact that he was not physically injured; physi-
cal impact is merely minimum requirement); Wishard v. Memorial Hosp., 512
N.E.2d 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (parents who received wrong child from hos-
pital staff barred from recovery for mental distress absent physical impact);
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walters, 466 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (deny-
ing recovery for mental distress resulting from breach of insect extermination
contract).
Kentucky: See Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (recognizing
right to substantial recovery for mental distress not directly related to initial
physical impact, even where physical injury is merely cosmetic, its existence is
debatable or it has completely healed); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.
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previously discussed with regard to the impact requirement continue to
exist in these jurisdictions. In Kentucky, for example, the supreme court
found it necessary to characterize the "bombardment of X-rays" as a
physical impact in order to sustain recovery to a woman who underwent
an elective abortion after her physician failed to ascertain that she was
pregnant before exposing her to such X-rays. 60 That same court later
noted that substantial recovery for mental distress is available even
where such distress is not directly related to the initial physical impact. 6 '
Further, the physical injury may be merely cosmetic or completely
healed, and its very existence may be debatable. 6 2
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that contemporane-
ous physical impact is merely a minimum requirement for maintaining
actions for mental distress.63 Subsequent court of appeals cases in Indi-
ana have held that "there is no requirement that the injury be severe to
support the parasitic mental anguish claim. A causal connection is all
that is mandated. ' '64 In the District of Columbia, there is no require-
ment that the physical impact be substantial.6 5 Rather, the severity of
impact is to be considered only as an element of proof at trial. 66
The underinclusive nature of the impact rule is clearly exemplified
in Saecho v. Matsakoun.6 7 In Saecho, three minor children witnessed their
brother being killed when he was struck by the defendant's negligently
driven automobile. 68 One sibling was in close proximity to the accident
and sustained physical injuries, while the other two siblings stood ap-
proximately fifteen feet away. 6 9 The Oregon Court of Appeals held that
the child who sustained physical injuries could recover for his emotional
1980) (bombardment of X-rays constituted sufficient physical impact to preg-
nant woman to sustain recovery for distress resulting from elective abortion).
Oregon: See Saecho v. Matsakoun, 78 Or. App. 341, 717 P.2d 165 (1986)(sibling who sustained physical injuries from car accident could recover damages
for mental distress stemming from witnessing killing of brother; two other sib-
lings in close proximity, who sustained no physical impact, barred from recov-
ery); see also Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 652
P.2d 318 (1982) (in action for loss of parental consortium, court analogized inter
alia, to actions for negligent infliction of mental distress, in denying such
recovery).
60. Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980).
61. Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ky. 1984).
62. Id.
63. Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 428, 61 N.E.2d 326, 327
(1945).
64. Kroger Co. v. Beck, 176 Ind. App. 202, 205 & n.1, 375 N.E.2d 640, 643
& n.1 (1978).
65. Parrish v. United States, 357 F.2d 828, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
66. Id.;.see also Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 n.20 (D.C.
1980).
67. 78 Or. App. 340, 717 P.2d 165 (1986).
68. Id. at 342-43, 717 P.2d at 166.
69. Id.
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distress stemming from witnessing the death of his brother,70 while the
remaining two children were barred from recovery. 7 1
The court adopted the impact requirement because it reasoned that
such a rule "reflect[s] the best policy option [since] It]he line it provides
is clear, and it creates a clear relationship between compensability and
the plaintiff's being a victim of a breach of duty." 72 The court refused
to adopt a rule which would allow recovery to those individuals who do
not sustain physical injury, but who are in imminent apprehension of
physical harm (the so-called "zone of danger" rule), 73 reasoning that
the mental distress engendered by witnessing injury to a loved one
would likely be the same whether the plaintiff was in the zone of danger
or not.7 4 Thus, because the court felt that a more expansive rule would
itself be underinclusive in providing redress to injured plaintiffs, it chose
a more conservative rule. 75
B. The "Zone of Danger" and "Physical Manifestation" Requirements
A large majority of jurisdictions have abandoned the physical im-
pact requirement as a limitation on actions for mental distress. 76 In
place of physical impact, many of these jurisdictions have extended lia-
bility to those plaintiffs who are foreseeably placed at risk of physical
harm by the conduct in question. This limiting mechanism has become
known as the "zone of danger" test. 7 7 Notably, this test does not extend
liability to those individuals who are foreseeably psychologically af-
fected, 78 but rather is limited to those who are placed in imminent ap-
prehension of physical harm at the time of the breach. 79
One of the original and perhaps best known decisions which
adopted the zone of danger test was Dulieu v. White & Sons.8 0 In Dulieu,
the defendant had negligently driven a horse-drawn van into the plain-
tiff's tavern.8 1 The plaintiff, a pregnant woman, sustained severe ner-
70. Id. at 345, 717 P.2d at 168.
71. Id. at 348, 717 P.2d at 169-70.
72. Id. at 348, 717 P.2d at 169.
73. For a discussion of the zone of danger rule, see infra notes 76-90 and
accompanying text.
74. Saecho, 78 Or. App. at 348, 717 P.2d at 169.
75. For a discussion of the underinclusiveness of the zone of danger rule,
see infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
76. See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 n.l (Wyo. 1986) (list of ju-
risdictions abrogating physical impact rule).
77. For further discussion and critical analysis of the zone of danger test,
see generally Comment, supra note 15, at 560-66; Comment, Foreseeability, supra
note 7, at 313-15.
78. For a discussion of those jurisdictions which allow recovery to plaintiffs
who are foreseeably psychologically harmed, see infra notes 186-96 and accom-
panying text.
79. See generally Comment, supra note 15, at 560.
80. 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
81. Id. at 670.
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vous shock as a result of the incident, and she ultimately gave premature
birth to an intellectually deficient child. 8 2 The court noted that the op-
erator of a vehicle on a highway owes a duty of due care not to injure
persons or property on or adjacent to the highway.8 3 The court held
that the duty extended to the plaintiff due to her "reasonable apprehen-
sion of immediate bodily hurt." 8 4
The fact that the plaintiff in Dulieu was within the zone of physical
danger was not sufficient, by itself, to sustain recovery. This merely es-
tablished that a duty existed which had been breached. In order to es-
tablish actual damages, the plaintiff was also required to prove that she
sustained a physical injury as the direct and natural result of the initial
emotional distress.8 5 The court reasoned that "[i]f [the defendant's]
negligence has caused [the plaintiff] neither injury to property nor phys-
ical mischief, but only an unpleasant emotion of more or less transient
duration, an essential constituent of a right of action for negligence is
lacking."86
This so-called "physical manifestation" requirement served two ma-
jor purposes. First, it served to limit the potential liability of defendants
since a cause of action was only available in those cases where physical
injury could be established. 8 7 Second, it operated as an element of
proof that the plaintiff suffered actual mental distress, and thus that the
suit was not trivial or fraudulent. 88
82. Id.
83. Id. at 671. This duty presumably arises because individuals on or adja-
cent to a highway are foreseeably placed at risk of harm by the operation of an
automobile. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99,
100 (1928) (duty is owed to those individuals who are foreseeably harmed by
conduct in question).
84. Dulieu, 2 K.B. at 672. The court went on to note, in dicta, that such a
duty would not extend to an individual who sustained psychic discomfort as a
result of fear for the safety of another: "A. has, I conceive, no legal duty not to
shock B.'s nerves by the exhibition of negligence towards C., or towards the
property of B. or C." Id. at 675. This so-called "bystander limitation" has con-
tinued in vitality in most jurisdictions to this day. For a discussion of jurisdic-
tions which allow bystander recovery to plaintiffs who are also within the zone of
danger, see infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. For a discussion ofjuris-
dictions allowing general bystander recovery, see infra notes 139, 145-46 and
accompanying text.
85. Dulieu, 2 K.B. at 673. In the present case, this requirement was met
because the plaintiff suffered a premature and problematic delivery. Id. at 670.
86. Id. at 673.
87. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985). The Champion
court stated: "We recognize that [the physical manifestation requirement] is
somewhat arbitrary, but in our view it is necessary to curb the potential of fraud-
ulent claims, and to place some boundaries on the indefinable and un-
measurable psychic claims." Id.
88. As the Dulieu court stated: "Fear . . .taken alone falls short of being
actual damage not because it is a remote or unlikely consequence, but because it
can be proved and measured only by physical effects." Dulieu, 2 K.B. at 673
(quoting F. POLLACK, THE LAW OF TORTS 51 (6th ed. 1901)).
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Similarly, the zone of danger rule served to limit the liability of de-
fendants by preventing recovery to the potentially large number of indi-
viduals who would become emotionally upset as a result of either
witnessing the injuries to another, or as the result of concern for the
injuries to a loved one.8 9 Further, by limiting recovery to individuals
who were directly exposed to physical harm, the courts could be better
assured of the legitimacy of the claim. 90
1. The Current Status of the Zone of Danger and Physical Manifestation Tests
Currently, a large number of jurisdictions follow a combination of
both the zone of danger and physical manifestation tests as limiting de-
vices on actions for negligent infliction of mental distress. 9 1 A few juris-
89. See, e.g., James v. Harris, 729 P.2d 986, 988 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) ("de-
fendant's duty and plaintiff's right . . . can neither justly nor expediently be
extended to . . . one out of the range of ordinary physical peril") (quoting
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1934)); Stadler v.
Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980) (if limits of zone of danger not con-
sistently and meaningfully applied, imposition of liability would become "arbi-
trary and capricious"); Wetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972)
(without zone of danger test, liability would be limitless and standards judicially
unmanageable); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969) (zone of danger test necessary to limit liability; burden-
some liability is "dollars-and-cents argument"). For further discussion of the
Tobin court's criticism of bystander recovery, see infra notes 134-38 and accom-
panying text.
90. See, e.g., Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 313; Comment, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander-Recent Developments, 30
MERCER L. REV. 735, 737-38 (1979).
91. Arizona: See Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (en
banc). For further discussion of Keck, see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying
text.
Colorado: See Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978) (en
banc) (boy in direct proximity to destruction of home, who manifested night-
mares, sleepwalking, nervousness and irritability, stated cause of action); James
v. Harris, 729 P.2d 986 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (parents who witnessed child be-
ing run over by car not in zone of danger).
Delaware: See Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del.
1984) (workers suffering mental distress after being exposed to asbestos failed
to allege present physical injury); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210
A.2d 709 (1965) (woman who narrowly escaped impact from train and suffered
subsequent cessation of lactation stated cause of action).
Idaho: See Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606
P.2d 944 (1980) (man whose farm equipment was auctioned at too low price
failed to allege physical manifestation of mental distress); Summers v. Western
Idaho Potato Processing Co., 94 Idaho 1,479 P.2d 292 (1971) (employee whose
clothes were ripped off by machinery leaving her nude in front of fellow employ-
ees failed to allege physical manifestation of humiliation).
Illinois: See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1
(1983) (minor who witnessed serious injury to brother on escalator required to
plead and prove he was in zone of danger and suffered resulting physical injury);
Hunt v. Chettri, 158 Ill. App. 3d 76, 510 N.E.2d 1324 (1987) (barring recovery
to mother of stillborn infant because mother not reasonably fearful for own
safety and did not suffer subsequent physical injury). For further discussion of
796 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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Rickey, and its implications for subsequent cases in Illinois, see Winter, A Tort in
Transition: Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 62, 66 (March
1984).
Maryland: See Abbott v. Forest Hill State Bank, 60 Md. App. 447, 483 A.2d
387 (1984) (physical manifestation requirement necessary to guard against
feigned claims); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (mother
who witnessed negligent killing of daughter by automobile not within zone of
danger).
Minnesota: See Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986)
(man who was forced to have sexual contact with nude dancer failed to meet
physical manifestation test; wife was not in zone of danger); Stadler v. Cross, 295
N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980) (parents who witnessed serious injury to child not
within zone of danger; defendant's liability for consequences of act cannot be
unlimited).
Mississippi: See Entex., Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982) (grant-
ing recovery for nervous condition following gas explosion in plaintiff's pres-
ence which destroyed home and injured wife; dicta that recovery available to
plaintiff not within zone of danger who witnesses injuries to another); First Nat'l
Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975) (agent of bank wrongly suspected
of theft stated action for subsequent physical and mental pain).
North Carolina: See Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 84 N.C.
App. 314, 352 S.E.2d 902 (mother of child injured during breech delivery failed
to allege physical manifestation of distress), aff'd, 321 N.C. 260, 362 S.E.2d 273
(1987); Woodell v. Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, 78 N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716
(1985) (per curiam) (woman who was negligently misinformed she was pregnant
with twins failed to allege physical manifestation of distress), aft'd, 316 N.C. 550,
342 S.E.2d 523 (1986); Wyatt v. Gilmore, 57 N.C. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 790
(1982) (man who suffered heart attack after car struck tree on property stated
cause of action). But see Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48
(1960) (woman who suffered neurotic disorder after car collision failed to state
cause of action because collision not proximate cause of disorder; defendant was
under no duty to guard against peculiar predisposition of plaintiff, especially
where plaintiff's distress resulted from imagined fear for another).
Oklahoma: See Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla.
1986) (consumer who became physically ill after finding what she thought was
worm in soft drink stated cause of action for mental distress; no recovery avail-
able for harm directed at third party).
South Carolina: See Rhodes v. Security Fin. Corp., 268 S.C. 300, 233 S.E.2d
105 (1977) (emotional distress resulting from debt collection attempt not ex-
treme or severe enough); Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C.
593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958) (recovery available for emotional distress resulting
in skin rash, weight loss and fever following car accident). In a slightly different
context than a traditional tort action, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that a man who died of a cerebral hemorrage after witnessing injury to his son
was entitled to accident insurance despite the fact that his injury resulted initially
from mental distress from witnessing injury to another. Twitty v. Key Life Ins.
Co., 260 S.C. 573, 197 S.E.2d 656 (1973).
South Dakota: See Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1979) (emo-
tional distress following negligent mishandling of corpse noncompensable ab-
sent subsequent physical injury).
Tennessee: See Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861
(Tenn. 1978) (father who learned of serious injury to daughter not within zone
of danger; dicta that would extend liability to relative who directly perceived
incident); Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn. App. 182, 397 S.W.2d 409 (1965) (emo-
tional distress resulting in heart attack when car struck plaintiff's home held
compensable).
Vermont: See Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d
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dictions92 require that the plaintiff be within the zone of physical
danger, but have expressly abandoned the requirement of physical man-
ifestation of psychic distress. 93 Those jurisdictions which have extended
liability beyond the zone of physical danger, but which continue to re-
92 (1980) (father of dead fetus not within zone of danger; mother reasonably
feared for own safety so as to sustain recovery); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt.
116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969) (mother who witnessed serious injury to daughter not
within zone of danger); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d
656 (1967) (infant whose house was struck by defendant's truck stated action for
subsequent nervous shock, sleeplessness, loss of appetite resulting in weight
loss, faintness and trembling).
Virginia: See Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 233 (1986) (injuries
to stillborn fetus considered as physical injury to mother so that mother could
recover damages for mental distress); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d
214 (1973) (woman who suffered pains in chest and arms, cessation of lactation
and premature resumption of menses after defendant drove car into her porch
stated cause of action; physical manifestation of mental distress must be demon-
strated, by clear and convincing evidence, to have naturally resulted from fright
caused by defendant's conduct).
West Virginia: See Monteleone v. Cooperative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340,
36 S.E.2d 475 (1945) (woman whose face was slightly cut by splintered glass
when trolly wire struck car failed to state cause of action for headaches resulting
from post-traumatic psychoneurosis; physical injury must naturally flow from se-
rious mental distress).
Wisconsin: See Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d
137 (1985) (teen who witnessed police car seriously injure brother stated cause
of action because she was member of group police were chasing, and thus was in
zone of danger; hysteria was sufficient physical manifestation of psychic dis-
tress); La Fleur v. Mosher, 109 Wis. 2d 112, 325 N.W.2d 314 (1982) (physical
manifestation of distress unnecessary where independent "guarantee of genu-
ineness of the claim" exists; such guarantee present in action for wrongful con-
finement); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957) (heart attack
resulting from fright after collision of truck with plaintiff's house compensable
since plaintiff feared for personal safety). For further discussion of Garrett, see
infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
92. Alabama: See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hancock, 506 So. 2d 305
(Ala. 1987) (awarding damages for mental distress and physical deterioration
following wrongful repossession of trucks); Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center,
400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981) (parent of stillborn fetus stated action without ante-
cedent physical impact or resulting physical manifestation of psychic distress;
mental suffering is recognizable standing alone).
New York: See Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277,
429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981) (daughter who witnessed transfusion
of mismatched blood to mother not in zone of danger); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Battalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (infant who suffered
mental distress when improperly secured in ski chair stated cause of action). For
further discussion of Tobin, see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
North Dakota: See Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323 n.9,
336 n.8 (N.D. 1986) (utilizing zone of danger limitation as illustration that not
all injuries are entitled to legal recognition); Wetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (mother who witnessed nurse drop newborn on floor
not within zone of danger).
93. For a discussion of other jurisdictions which have expressly abandoned
the physical manifestation requirement, see infra note 119 and accompanying
text.
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quire resulting physical injury, are discussed later in this Comment. 94
Several of those jurisdictions which require that the plaintiff be
within the zone of danger have explicitly held that once it has been es-
tablished that the plaintiff suffered imminent apprehension of physical
harm, damages are recoverable despite the fact that the mental distress
resulted primarily or exclusively from concern for the safety of another
individual. 95 For example, in Keck v. Jackson,96 the plaintiff and her
mother were parked in the emergency lane of a highway in order to re-
pair a flat tire when their vehicle was negligently struck by the defend-
ant.97 The plaintiff received serious physical injuries, while her mother
received injuries resulting in death after three months of hospitaliza-
tion.98 The Supreme Court of Arizona held that recovery was available
for the plaintiff's mental distress despite the fact that the distress re-
sulted predominantly from witnessing the injuries to her mother. 99 The
court held that such distress to a bystander is foreseeable from the per-
spective of the defendant only if the bystander has a close personal rela-
tionship, either by consanguinity or otherwise, with the victim.10 0 In an
effort at limiting the potential liability of defendants, the court required
that the plaintiff also be in reasonable apprehension of physical harm
from the defendant's conduct.' 0 ' Further, the mental distress had to be
manifested as a physical injury because purely emotional damages were
94. For a discussion of these jurisdictions, see infra notes 139, 145-46 and
accompanying text.
95. See Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (en banc) (wo-
man in car struck by defendant could recover damages for distress resulting
from witnessing injuries to mother); Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579
P.2d 1163 (1978) (en banc) (boy in direct proximity to destruction of home and
injury to sister stated cause of action); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Il1. 2d
546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983) (minor who witnessed serious injury to brother on
escalator must plead and prove he also reasonably feared for own safety);
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (if plaintiff was in immi-
nent apprehension of physical harm, no apportionment of damages based on
fear for self versus others is necessary); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483
N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010, (1985) (mother of fetus that died as result of
negligent performance of amniocentesis barred from recovery because mother
did not learn of injury until stillbirth one month later; distress to plaintiff within
zone of danger which results from concern for safety of another is recoverable,
but must result from contemporaneous observance of injury); Bovsun v.
Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984) (wife and
daughter who were in vehicle struck by defendant's automobile stated action for
mental distress resulting from witnessing injuries to husband/father; such rule
adequately addresses concern for unlimited liability). For further discussion of
Keck, see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
Garrett, see infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
96. 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (en banc).
97. Id. at 114, 593 P.2d at 668.
98. Id.
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deemed to be too speculative. 10 2
It should be apparent that, logically, such a holding implicitly allows
for the recovery of damages which were not caused by the defendant's
breach of a legal duty. If the defendant's sole legal obligation is to avoid
exposing the plaintiff to physical harm, then such exposure did consti-
tute a breach. However, it was not that breach which caused the plain-
tiff's emotional injury, but rather the defendant's independent and
separate breach of a duty to the mother. The court's analysis exposes
the actual policy rationale behind the zone of danger test. The require-
ment that a plaintiff be within the zone of danger is actually a threshold
device which limits the potential liability of a defendant.10 3 Once this
requirement is met, a plaintiff may recover for all damages which flowed
from the incident, whether they were related to the breach or not.
Other jurisdictions have also stretched the zone of danger analysis
in order to provide recovery where there was little concern for overex-
tending the defendant's liability or opening the way for trivial or fraudu-
lent claims. In Garrett v. City of New Berlin,10 4 a brother and sister and a
group of their friends were watching an outdoor movie, apparently with-
out having paid for admission. A police car entered the premises with
its headlights extinguished in pursuit of the children, and ran over the
plaintiff's brother, causing him severe and permanent injuries.' 0 5 The
sister was at all times no closer to the police vehicle than fifteen or
twenty feet, and she never feared for her own safety. 10 6 As a result of
her mental distress from witnessing the injuries to her brother, she suf-
fered insomnia, disruption of her family relationships, lowering of her
school grades and deterioration in her self-image. 10 7
The trial court granted summary judgment against the sister's
claim, holding that she was not within the zone of danger and did not
suffer any resulting physical manifestation of her initial distress. 10 8 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, holding that the sister was within
the zone of danger since she was a member of the group that the officers
were pursuing.' 0 9 The court felt that it did not matter that her distress
resulted from concern for her brother's safety rather than her own, not-
ing that she was a witness to the injuries, and thus, there was little fear of
opening the way for fraudulent claims or unlimited liability.I 10
Further, the court held that the sister's "hysteria" at the scene of
102. Id. at 115-16, 593 P.2d at 669-70 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A (1965)).
103. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
104. 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985).
105. Id. at 226, 362 N.W.2d at 139.
106. Id. at 226-27, 362 N.W.2d at 139.
107. Id. at 227, 362 N.W.2d at 140.
108. Id. at 227-28, 362 N.W.2d at 140.
109. Id. at 232-33, 362 N.W.2d at 142.
110. Id. at 234, 362 N.W.2d at 143.
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the accident, coupled with her subsequent insomnia and deteriorating
academic and interpersonal performance, constituted sufficient physical
injury. I 11
As in Garrett, many courts have found subsequent physical manifes-
tation of psychic distress on the facts of a case where concerns with un-
limited liability or fraudulent claims were minimal. 1 12 As a result,
damages are awarded despite the lack of a causal connection between
the defendant's conduct and the required physical injury."l 3 However,
a few jurisdictions which follow the physical manifestation rule have ad-
ded explicit requirements that the physical injury be substantial and
causally connected to the defendant's breach.' 14
2. Critique and Abandonment of the Physical Manifestation Requirement
The physical manifestation requirement has been criticized as being
overinclusive, in that it permits recovery for demonstrably trivial mental
distress accompanied by physical symptoms, and underinclusive, since
serious distress is noncompensable absent the happenstance of subse-
111. Id. at 236, 362 N.W.2d at 144. The court cited certain medical author-
ities in stating that hysteria is a neurotic condition often characterized by conver-
sion of anxiety to physical symptoms such as convulsions and muscular
contractions. Id. at 236-37, 362 N.W.2d at 144-45 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 782 (2d Lawyer's ed. 1966); 2 J. SCHMIDT, ATrORNEY's DICTIONARY
OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER H-142 (1984)). For a discussion of the diagnos-
tic criteria for the disorders described by the court, see DSM-III-R, supra note
28, at 255-67. Notably, the court did not address the fact that such "convul-
sions" and "contractions" were not alleged in the present case.
112. See Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978) (night-
mares, sleepwalking, nervousness and irritability); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58
Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965) (cessation of lactation); Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,
414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982) (exacerbation of Parkinson's disease, sleeplessness
and nightmares); First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975) (over-
breathing, muscular tension, shaking, sweating and edema of lip and tongue);
Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967) (sleeplessness
and loss of appetite resulting in weight loss).
113. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So. 2d 369, 373 (Ala.
1981) ("perfectly obvious that any injury from the traditional tort [requirement
of physical manifestation] is slight and the damages sought for the mental distur-
bance constitute the primary (if not the sole) reason for having initiated the ac-
tion"); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 344, 398
A.2d 1180, 1184 (1978) (noting tendency of plaintiffs to exaggerate bodily
symptoms to predicate parasitic recovery for more grievous emotional injury).
114. See Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d
1214 (1983) (subsequent physical injury must be direct and proximate result of
distress caused by negligence of defendant, and must appear within short span
of time after initial emotional disturbance); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197
S.E.2d 214 (1973) (plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
physical injuries naturally resulted from fright proximately caused by defend-
ant's conduct); Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 36
S.E.2d 475 (1945) (plaintiff may recover only for physical injury which naturally
results from serious mental distress).
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quent physical symptoms. 1 15 Further, such a rule may actually en-
courage extravagant pleading and distorted testimony by the plaintiff in
order to state a cause of action, since once a physical manifestation is
established, damages are awarded almost entirely for mental anguish.' 16
It is often asserted that advances in the medical and mental health
sciences have enabled adequate proof of the existence and degree of
psychic distress without the existence of "objective" physical
symptomology."1 7 Thus, it is argued that physical symptoms should be
viewed as highly persuasive evidence of the extent of the distress, rather
than as a threshold requirement for bringing the action.' 18
As a result of all, or some combination of, these criticisms, several
jurisdictions have explicitly abandoned the physical manifestation
requirement. ' 19
115. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437
(Me. 1982) (physical manifestation requirement is over and underinclusive);
James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 58, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (1985) (same).
116. As one court commented: "To ... require that, before one who is
mentally injured may recover, he must at least regurgitate once seems ... to be
imposing upon the law a requirement that makes little or no sense." James v.
Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 58, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (1985) (quoting Fournell v. Usher
Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 697, 305 N.W.2d 605, 611 (1981) (Krivosha,
C.J., dissenting), overruled, James, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109).
117. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So. 2d, 369, 374 (Ala.
1981) (requiring physical manifestation would be "adherence to procrustean
principles which have little or no resemblance to medical realities"); Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672, 678 (1979) ("[i]t has been long assumed that
medical science is unable to establish that the alleged psychic injuries in fact
resulted from [an] accident .... Advancements in medical and psychiatric sci-
ence throughout this century have discredited these hoary beliefs."); Note, supra
note 2, at 854.
118. See Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 77, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65
(1983) (physical manifestation can be factor in helping jury decide whether claim
is compensable); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 200 (Wyo. 1986) (it is suffi-
cient that plaintiff has burden of proving damages).
119. Alabama: See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hancock, 506 So. 2d 305
(Ala. 1987); Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981).
California: See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). Connecticut: See Morris v. Hartford Courant Co.,
200 Conn. 676, 513 A.2d 66 (1986); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel.
Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978). Hawaii: See Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509
(1970). Iowa: See Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981). Louisiana:
See Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
Maine: See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
Missouri: See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Davis
v. Shelton, 710 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Montana: SeeJohnson v. Super-
save Markets, Inc., 686 P.2d 209 (Mont. 1984); Versland v. Caron Transp., 206
Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983). Nebraska: SeeJames v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375
N.W.2d 109 (1985). NewJersey: See Ayers v. Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d
287 (1987); Portes v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). New York: See
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
North Dakota: See Wetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
Ohio: See Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); Shultz v.
802 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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C. Foreseeable PlaintiffAnalysis-The Dillon Criteria
The zone of danger limitation, which conditions recovery upon a
plaintiff's having been in imminent apprehension of personal physical
harm, has also been heavily criticized as being over and underinclu-
sive. 120 The underinclusive nature of this limitation was cogently dis-
cussed in the landmark decision by the California Supreme Court in
Dillon v. Legg.121 In Dillon, the defendant had been negligently operating
his automobile when he struck an infant child, causing her fatal inju-
ries.12 2 The deceased's mother was in close proximity, and personally
witnessed the collision. 123 The trial court sustained the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment against the mother because she had not
been within the zone of physical danger. 12 4
The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling
against the mother and discarded the zone of danger requirement. 12 5
Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983). Pennsylvania:
See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). Texas: See St. Elizabeth
Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987). Washington: See Hunsley v.
Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (dicta). Wyoming: See Gates v.
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
120. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 435,
436 (Me. 1982) (noting the "arbitrary and unjust consequences of applying a
spatial limitation on liability," and that "zone of danger rule bars claims by rea-
sonably foreseeable plaintiffs regardless of the authenticity and severity of the
injury"); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 564, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300
(1978) (zone of danger rule "lacks strong logical support"); Paugh v. Hanks, 6
Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983) (zone of danger rule is unduly restrictive
and prevents redress where emotional injury is severe and foreseeable); Saecho
v. Matsakoun, 78 Or. App. 340, 717 P.2d 165 (1986) (zone of danger rule does
not provide rational differentiations between those who may recover and those
who may not).
121. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc). For
further discussion of Dillon, see generally McCarthy, supra note 9, at 26-27; Com-
ment, supra note 15, at 567-72; Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 314-17.
122. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
123. Id. The deceased's sister was also in close proximity and personally
witnessed the event. Id.
124. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The motion for sum-
mary judgment against the sister was denied because it was unclear from the
pleadings whether she had feared for her own safety at the time of the collision.
Id. The trial court had been applying the California Supreme Court's prior
holding in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), that in order to recover, a plaintiff must be within the
zone of physical danger. Dillon expressly overruled Amaya. 68 Cal. 2d at 748,
441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
125. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
The court began:
In the first place, we can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma
which she suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and yet deny
it to the mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was
some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the
hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule.
Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
1988] COMMENT 803
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The court stated that the zone of danger rule merely represents a con-
clusion about the scope of a defendant's duty to foreseeable plaintiffs; it
reflects no more than a sum total of public policy considerations. 1 26 In
discarding the old rule, the court, in turn, addressed some of the policy
considerations typically associated with actions for negligent infliction of
mental distress.' 2 7 With regard to the fear of potentially fraudulent liti-
gation, the court stated that, despite this possibility, there could cer-
tainly be no doubt that a parent who witnesses the death of his or her
child would foreseeably suffer mental and physical injury. 128 Further,
the possibility of successful recovery for fraudulent assertions in some
cases would not justify denying recovery for an entire class of actions. 129
Although the court acknowledged a real and substantial concern for
exposing defendants to potentially infinite liability, the court held that
the extent of such liability could be contained by traditional negligence
principles.' 30 Defendants would only owe a duty of due care to those
individuals who were foreseeably endangered by the conduct in ques-
tion. 13 1 Since the defendant's duty would depend on the degree of fore-
seeability of injury to the plaintiff, the Dillon court expressly
contemplated that the determination of the existence of a duty would be
made on a "case-by-case basis."' 13 2 The court fashioned a now well-
known set of factors or guidelines which future courts would take into
account in determining whether a defendant should reasonably have
foreseen injury to a particular plaintiff:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who wps a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the acci-
126. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (quoting W. PROSSER,
THE LAw OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964)).
127. Id. at 735-40, 441 P.2d at 917-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-81. For a discus-
sion and critical analysis of these policy considerations, see supra notes 16-18,
42-50 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 735-36, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77; accord Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). The Portee court stated: "[T]he interest
assertedly injured is more than a general interest in emotional tranquility. It is
the profound and abiding sentiment of parental love.... The law should find
more than pity for one who is stricken by seeing that a loved one has been criti-
cally injured or killed." Id. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526.
129. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 736, 417 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
130. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
131. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. For a discussion
of the landmark Palsgraf decision, which defined a legal duty as extending only to
those individuals who were foreseeably affected by the conduct in question, see
supra notes 39, 83.
132. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. For a discussion of the
inconsistent manner in which jurisdictions have applied the supposed flexible
Dillon factors, see infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
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dent from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and
the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of
any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship.[ 133]
The three Dillon factors-"proximity", "contemporaneous obser-
vance" and "relationship"--have not been adopted by all jurisdictions
which have considered them. For example, in the renowned decision in
Tobin v. Grossman,134 the New York Court of Appeals denied recovery to
a mother who was near the scene of the accident where her two year old
child was hit and seriously injured by the defendant's automobile. 13 5
The mother did not see the accident, but she heard the screech of the
brakes and immediately ran to the scene.' 3 6
The court stated that the recognition of an action for mental dis-
tress to a bystander who was not within the zone of physical danger de-
pended entirely upon a consideration of the social policy factors
involved.' 3 7 The court addressed each of the Dillon foreseeability fac-
tors in turn, and rejected them as insufficient to contain liability within
manageable limits. 1
3 8
133. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
134. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
135. Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55.
136. Id. Even if the Tobin court had adopted the Dillon holding, recovery
could have been denied since the mother arguably did not contemporaneously
observe the event. For a discussion of the split in jurisdictions regarding the
definition, scope and importance of contemporaneous perception, see infra
notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. The court stated
that this creation of a new cause of action did not depend upon advances in
medical science, technology or economics, but rather "[t]he question [was]
profounder than that." Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The
court reasoned it was irrelevant that there had been advances in the accuracy of
diagnosis and causal analysis of mental trauma. Id. Further, there was no sud-
den realization of the trauma that a parent experiences following injury to a
child. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. Rather, the court's
refusal to recognize a new cause of action depended solely upon a consideration
of risking unlimited liability to defendants. Id. at 615-17, 249 N.E.2d at 422-23,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 558-60.
138. Id. at 616-17, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60. The rela-
tionship factor was seen as inadequate because it would logically "extend to
older children, fathers, grandparents, relatives, or others in loco parentis, and
even to sensitive caretakers .... Moreover, in any one accident, there might
well be more than one person indirectly but seriously affected by the shock of
injury or death to the child." Id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
The proximity and contemporaneous observance factors were rejected as being
too difficult to define and circumscribe. The court stated that "[a]ny rule based
solely on eyewitnessing the accident could stand only until the first case comes
along in which the parent is in the immediate vicinity but did not see the acci-
dent." Id. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
19881 COMMENT 805
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1. Current Status of the Dillon Analysis
Despite the Tobin court's admonitions, several jurisdictions have
adopted the Dillon criteria nearly verbatim.1 3 9 A few jurisdictions have
139. Florida: See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985) (mother
who died of shock and grief after hearing, and coming immediately upon scene
of, fatal injury to daughter stated cause of action; plaintiff must be "directly in-
volved in the event" and must have "especially close emotional attachment" to
the injured party); Brown v. Cadillac Motors Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla.
1985) (man who struck and killed mother due to defective automobile must still
allege demonstrable physical injury flowing from accident). For further discus-
sion of Champion with regard to defining the scope of the contemporaneous ob-
servance requirement, see infra note 167 and accompanying text.
Maine: See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me.
1982) (mother who witnessed child choke on defective baby food stated cause of
action).
Massachusetts: See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d
1295 (1978) (mother who arrived on scene shortly after daughter was struck by
automobile stated cause of action; requiring 1) parent who 2) witnesses event or
comes on scene while injured child still there and who 3) suffers physical mani-
festation of distress).
Michigan: See Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exch. v. McMillan, 159 Mich.
App. 49, 406 N.W.2d 232 (1987) (mother who arrived at accident scene one
hour after daughter was removed from car failed to meet contemporaneous ob-
servance factor); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140
(1973) (mother who witnessed child being run over by truck stated cause of ac-
tion; allowing recovery for 1) parent who 2) witnesses injuries to child and
3) suffers physical manifestation of distress).
Nevada: See State v. Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (1985) (mother of
child killed when family car skidded on ice entitled to recover even though not in
zone of danger; placing greatest emphasis on contemporaneous observance fac-
tor because recovery not available for "mere grief").
New Hampshire: See Nutter v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 124 N.H. 791, 474
A.2d 584 (1984) (parents who arrived at hospital shortly after death of infant,
and who were immediately advised of death, failed to meet contemporaneous
observance factor); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979)
(mother who heard thud when car struck daughter and saw daughter moments
later, and father who heard wife scream, stated cause of action; requiring 1) par-
ent who 2) contemporaneously sensorially perceives 3) serious injury to child
and 4) suffers physical manifestation of distress).
Ohio: See Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983) (woman
who suffered distress due to concern for own and children's safety after cars
collided with fence on her property stated cause of action).
Pennsylvania: See Brooks v. Decker, 512 Pa. 365, 516 A.2d 1380 (1986) (fa-
ther who passed ambulance which was rushing to scene of son's accident failed
to meet contemporaneous observance factor); Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512
Pa. 266, 516 A.2d 672 (1986) (mother who was one mile away from scene of
child's accident, and who received phone call regarding the accident immedi-
ately thereafter, failed to meet contemporaneous observance factor); Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (mother who witnessed daughter being
struck and killed by negligently driven automobile stated cause of action).
Rhode Island: See Curtis v. State Dept. for Children & Families, 522 A.2d
203 (R.I. 1987) (parents of child detained in hospital due to wrongful suspicion
of child abuse failed to state cause of action absent allegation of physical mani-
festation of distress); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524
(1975) (mother who witnessed son being struck and killed by mail truck stated
cause of action; refusing to extend liability beyond Dillon).
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expressed a willingness to do so if an appropriate test case came
along. 14 0 Further, several jurisdictions have adopted the Dillon factors
while adding the requirement that the plaintiff suffer distress from wit-
nessing objectively serious injury14 to the third party.' 4 2
Texas: See City of Pasadena v. Freeman, 731 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (stepfather who rushed to scene after accident, and did not see stepson
until later at hospital, did not meet contemporaneous observance factor), aft'd,
744 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1988); Hastie v. Rodriques, 716 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (woman who lived with man for five years, but did not establish ele-
ments of common law marriage, did not meet relationship factor); Landreth v.
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (minor who witnessed sister drown
in pool stated cause of action).
140. Mississippi: See Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)
(recovery available for nervous condition following gas explosion in plaintiff's
presence which destroyed home and injured wife; dicta that recovery available to
bystander not within zone of danger).
Tennessee: See Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861
(Tenn. 1978) (father who learned of serious injuries to daughter after accident
failed to state cause of action; dicta that recovery available to close relative who
directly perceives event).
141. As one court commented: "We base this limitation on the common
sense notion that people recover from serious shock quickly if it turns out to be
a false alarm." Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986); accord Por-
tee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (perception of less serious harm
would not ordinarily result in severe emotional distress). For a discussion of this
author's proposal that recovery be conditioned on the objective degree of stress
expected to be engendered by a particular event, see infra notes 238-82 and
accompanying text.
142. Iowa: See Roberts v. Bruns, 387 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1986) (mother who
was not present when daughter critically injured by hit and run driver failed to
meet proximity and contemporaneous observance factors); Oberreuter v. Orion
Indus., Inc., 342 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1984) (denying recovery to woman not pres-
ent when husband and son burned by electric line); Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981) (granting recovery to bystander who 1) is in proximity
to event, 2) contemporaneously observes injuries to 3) husband, wife or relative
within second degree of consanguinity and 4) reasonably and actually believed
victim would be killed or seriously injured).
Montana: See Versland v. Caron Transp., 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583
(1983) (wife who witnessed fatal injuries to husband from collision with truck
stated cause of action; requiring contemporaneous observance of accident, close
relationship to victim and death or serious injury to victim).
Nebraska: See James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985) (minor
who witnessed truck kill sister stated cause of action; modifying Dillon factors by
placing greatest weight on relationship factor, requiring marital or intimate fa-
milial relation with victim and requiring death or serious injury to victim).
New Jersey: See Portee v.Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (adopting
Dillon but placing greatest emphasis on relationship factor, requiring marital or
intimate familial relationship with victim and requiring death or serious injury to
victim); Polikoffv. Calabro, 209 N.J. Super. 110, 506 A.2d 1284 (1986) (mother
who witnessed negligent medical treatment to daughter, but did not witness
daughter's death, stated cause of action since mother contemporaneously ob-
served tortious conduct and injury).
New Mexico: See Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983)
(plaintiff must witness death or serious injury to the victim).
Wyoming: See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986) (plaintiff
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Notably, the Dillon court did not have to decide whether a physical
manifestation 14 3 of psychic distress was still necessary. 144 Subsequent
to Dillon, California has dispensed with that requirement.' 4 5 Those ju-
risdictions following the Dillon analysis are split regarding the need for
such a showing. 1
46
The three Dillon factors have been given different weights and have
been operationally defined in different manners in the jurisdictions
which have adopted the general Dillon rationale. A small number of
states have placed greatest emphasis on the relationship factor, 1 47 as-
serting that since the purpose of the factors is to assess the degree of
foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff, it should be apparent that it is
must witness serious injury or death to the victim and must realize, at the time,
that the injuries were serious).
143. For a discussion of the physical manifestation requirement, see supra
notes 76-90, 115-18 and accompanying text. For a discussion of jurisdictions
expressly abandoning this requirement, see supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
144. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The
Dillon court expressly noted that "we deal here with a case in which plaintiff
suffered a shock which resulted in physical injury and we confine our ruling to
that case." Id.
145. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
146. The following jurisdictions continue to require physical manifestation
of distress: Florida: See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985) (physical
manifestation necessary to curb fraudulent claims and place boundaries on "in-
definable and unmeasurable psychic claims"); Brown v. Cadillac Motors Car
Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1985) (plaintiff must allege demonstrable physical
injury, such as death, paralysis or muscular impairment, flowing from accident).
But see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(where antecedent physical impact present, plaintiff need not allege subsequent
physical manifestation).
Massachusetts: See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 552-53, 437
N.E.2d 171, 178-79 (1982) (physical manifestation requirement necessary to
avoid compensating feigned injury, contain defendants' liability, and keep liabil-
ity commensurate with level of culpability (i.e., mere negligence)); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (requiring resulting physical
harm).
Michigan: See Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140
(1973) (requiring that plaintiff suffer definite and objective resulting physical
injury).
New Hampshire: See Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979)
(requiring objective physical symptoms).
New Mexico: See Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983)
(requiring physical manifestation of distress).
Rhode Island: See Curtis v. State Dept. for Children & Families, 522 A.2d
203 (R.I. 1987) (parents of child detained in hospital due to wrongful suspicion
of child abuse must allege physical manifestation of distress).
147. SeeJames v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 55, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (1985) ("Per-
sonal relationship may link people together more tightly, if less tangibly, than
any mere physical and chronological proximity.") (quoting D'Ambra v. United
States, 114 R.I. 643, 656-57, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975)); Portee v.Jaffee, 84 N.J.
88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (relationship factor most crucial).
[Vol. 33: p. 781808
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most foreseeable that close relatives will be upset by serious injury to a
loved one. 14 8 Further, there has been a good deal of variability among
jurisdictions in defining the threshold requirement for a sufficient
"relationship." 149
Illustrative of some courts' treatment of the relationship factor is
the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in James v. Lieb. °50 The
James court adopted the Dillon rationale for bystander recovery, but em-
phasized that the Dillon factors "were not intended to be fixed guidelines
with [sic] which an aggrieved plaintiff-bystander was required to satisfy
in order to recover; rather, the factors were to be taken into account by
courts in assessing the degree of foreseeability of emotional injury to the
plaintiff."' 5 1 The court modified the Dillon requirements by placing the
greatest emphasis on the relationship factor because "[p]ersonal rela-
tionship may link people together more tightly, if less tangibly, than any
mere physical and chronological proximity."' 5 2 In order to satisfy the
relationship factor, the court held that there must be a marital or inti-
mate familial relationship between the plaintiff and victim. ' 5 3 The court
believed that such a requirement would serve to limit recovery to those
148. For further discussion of this proposition, see generally Liebson, supra
note 51, at 196 (other Dillon factors of no importance medically); Teff, Liability
for Negligently Inflicted Nervous Shock, 99 LAw. Q. REV. 100 (1983) (asserting that
relationship to victim should be primary factor in determining foreseeability of
emotional injury to plaintiff).
149. For example, Florida requires an "especially close emotional attach-
ment" to the injured party, Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985), while
Montana requires a "close relationship." Versland v. Caron Transp., 206 Mont.
313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983). Wyoming has defined the necessary relationship
through recourse to that state's wrongful death statute. Gates v. Richardson,
719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986). According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, such a
definition, limited to spouses, children, parents and siblings, serves the social
policy purposes of avoiding nuisance suits and fraudulent claims, and limiting
the potential liability of defendants. Id. Similarly, Iowa requires that the plain-
tiff and victim be husband and wife or related within the second degree of con-
sanguinity. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981). New Mexico
requires a marital or intimate familial relationship, limited to husband and wife,
parent and child, grandparent and grandchild, brother and sister or persons in
loco parentis. Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
150. 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985). In James, a brother and sister
had been riding their bicycles when a garbage truck which was negligently oper-
ated by an employee of the defendant backed over the sister and killed her. Id.
at 48, 375 N.W.2d at 111. The brother helplessly watched the collision and, as a
result, suffered physical and mental distress. Id.
151. Id. at 55, 375 N.W.2d at 114 (citing Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72,
76, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764 (1983)). This is precisely what the Dillon court had in
mind originally when it cautioned that the analysis it was adopting "contem-
plates that courts, on a case-by-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will
decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have
foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote
and unexpected." Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
152. James, 271 Neb. at 55, 375 N.W.2d at 115 (citing D'Ambra v. United
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who were most genuinely to be injured.' 54
The James court further noted that while the mental distress to a
close relative of the victim would likely be the same regardless of
whether the relative directly witnessed the event or heard about it later,
the contemporaneous observance and proximity factors were still neces-
sary because they served as policy limitations on the extent of the de-
fendant's liability. 15 5 The important consideration in determining
whether these factors have been met is "where, when, and how the in-
jury to the third person entered into the consciousness of the claimant,
and what degree there was of familial or other relationship .... 156
Finally, the court held that emotional distress would be actionable only
if the victim experienced death or serious injury from the defendant's
conduct. 157
In contrast to this fairly detailed treatment of the relationship fac-
tor, several jurisdictions have limited their holdings to the facts of the
case, apparently leaving further definition and refinement of the re-
quired relation between plaintiff and victim for future cases. 158 Other
courts have explicitly declined to draw a boundary around the class of
persons whose peril would foreseeably invoke mental distress. 159 In-
stead, this is left as a jury question bearing on the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's reaction to the event.' 60
The contemporaneous observance factor has received an even
greater disparity of treatment in jurisdictions following the Dillon analy-
sis. The importance of a direct perception of the event has been
154. Id.
155. Id. at 57, 375 N.W.2d at 116.
156. Id. (citing Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1302 (1978)).
.157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978) (granting recovery at least where parent witnesses injuries to child);
Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) (same); Corso
v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979) (same). In Texas, it is clear that a
brother may recover for witnessing injuries to a sister. See Landreth v. Reed, 570
S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). However, a woman may not recover for wit-
nessing injuries to a man with whom she has lived for five years, because they
did not establish the elements of a common law marriage. See Hastie v. Rodri-
guez, 716 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
159. See Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 80, 451 N.E.2d 759, 767 (1983).
160. See id. (citing Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096,
1103 (1976)). This notion that the relationship factor, or any of the other Dillon
factors, should really be employed to assess the reasonable severity of the injury to
the plaintiff (i.e., as an indicator of the foreseeability of injury as a matter of
proximate cause) has been employed by a few courts which have extended liabil-
ity beyond the concrete Dillon guidelines to a general foreseeability analysis. See,
e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). For further discus-
sion of the general foreseeability analysis, see infra notes 186-96, 228-34 and
accompanying text.
810 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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stressed by several courts. 16 1 In the absence of contemporaneous ob-
servance, the plaintiff's injuries are viewed in some jurisdictions as mere
grief, 16 2 which is only compensable in an action for loss of consortium
or solatium.163 In contrast, several jurisdictions view contemporaneous
observance as irrelevant to the degree of distress foreseeably exper-
ienced by the plaintiff. Rather, direct perception is viewed exclusively as
a policy limitation on defendants' liability.
164
Those jurisdictions placing significant emphasis on the contempo-
raneous observance factor are split regarding what constitutes "contem-
poraneous." In California, the appellate courts are either split
regarding whether a direct and immediate perception is necessary, or
have devised a myriad of corollary rules to allow recovery in certain situ-
ations. 165 Several states have explicitly defined "contemporaneous" as
161. See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986). In Gates, the court
stated: "The essence of the tort is the shock caused by the perception of an
especially horrendous event .... It is more than bad news .... It may be the
crushed body, the bleeding, the cries of pain, and, in some cases, the dying
words ..... Id. at 199 (citation omitted); accord Oberreuter v. Orion Indus., 342
N.W.2d 492, 494 (Iowa 1984) (proximity and contemporaneous observance nec-
essary to assure "horror" and "visceral participation" in the event).
Generally, the proximity factor has received less attention than the other
factors because, if the contemporaneous observance factor has been met, the
proximity factor has necessarily also been met. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 NJ.
88, 100, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980). Further, some courts view proximity as
merely evidence of the degree of emotional bond between the plaintiff and vic-
tim. See id. But see Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766
(1983) (proximity factor very important in determining foreseeability of injury
to plaintifffrom perspective of defendant).
162. See, e.g., State v. Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (1985).
163. See, e.g., Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 516 A.2d 672 (1986).
164. See, e.g., James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985) (mental
distress to close relative same regardless of direct perception of accident; con-
temporaneous observance factor necessary only to limit defendants' liability).
This sentiment has been most strenuously asserted in those jurisdictions re-
jecting the Dillon factors as threshold elements for recovery. See, e.g., Tommy's
Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Alaska 1986) (Dillon fac-
tors merely guidelines to be liberally construed), modified, Croft v. Wicker, 737
P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987) (abandoning contemporaneous observance factor in
favor of general foreseeability analysis). For further discussion of the general
foreseeability analysis, see infra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
165. Compare Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 657 (1978) (mother who heard neighbor scream son's name, and who ar-
rived at scene of son's near drowning immediately afterwards, stated cause of
action) and Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1969) (mother who arrived on scene moments after gunpowder explosion, and
immediately viewed injuries to son, stated cause of action) with Justus v. Atchi-
son, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) (father who was
present in delivery room when fetus died not contemporaneously aware of death
until he was told moments later), overruled, Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d
159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985) and Parsons v. Superior Court, 81
Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978) (parents who arrived on scene of
accident in which daughters were killed "before the dust had settled" failed to
meet contemporaneous observance factor) and Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d
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including arriving on the scene after the initial impact of the accident,
but before the victim is removed from the scene. 166 Other jurisdictions
are more vague (or liberal), granting recovery, for example, where the
plaintiff is "directly involved in the event" 16 7 or when the news of the
event "comes into the consciousness" of the plaintiff in a reasonably
quick manner. 16 8
Similar to the varied treatment of the term "contemporaneous,"
states have given disparate treatment to the terms "observation" and
"event." Although few, if any, courts have explicitly stated which senses
must be utilized in "observing" the event, it appears that at least seeing
or hearing the impact is sufficient. 16 9 However, a few courts have ex-
tended the plaintiff's "percipient presence."1 70 Further, there has been
221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971) (wife who did not see injured husband until she
arrived at hospital did not meet contemporaneous observance factor).
More recently, the California Supreme Court has approved, in dicta, of
those lower court decisions granting recovery to plaintiffs who arrive on the
scene of the accident immediately after the impact of the tortious act. See Ochoa
v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985) (ap-
proving, inter alia, of Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 723 (1969) and Nazaroffv. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 657 (1978)).
166. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978) (recovery available to plaintiff who either witnesses event or comes on
scene while child still there; dispositive issue is how, when and where event came
into consciousness of plaintiff); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986)
(plaintiff must contemporaneously observe event or immediately come upon
scene).
167. See, e.g., Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985). In defining
"directly involved in the event," the Supreme Court of Florida stated that if the
plaintiff sees or hears the accident, or arrives on the scene while the victim is still
there, he or she is likely "involved." Id. at 20. The court stated that it did not
reach the question whether seeing the injured person in the hospital shortly af-
ter the event would be sufficient, but noted that "we would think that this scena-
rio reaches the outer limits of the required involvement with the event." Id.
168. See, e.g., James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985) (impor-
tant consideration is how, when and where injury came into consciousness of
plaintiff) (quoting Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1302 (1978)).
169. See, e.g., Nazaroffv. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 566-67, 145
Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (1978) (mother who heard neighbor scream son's name, and
who arrived on scene of son's near drowning immediately afterwards, stated
cause of action); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979) (mother
who heard thud when car struck daughter stated cause of action; father who
heard wife scream and rushed to scene also stated cause of action); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79-80, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (1983) (plaintiff does not
have to actually see accident; observance through sense of hearing is sufficient).
170. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1977). In Krouse, the plaintiff had been sitting in his car while his wife
and a neighbor were removing groceries from the back seat. Id. at 65, 562 P.2d
at 1024, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The defendant negligently lost control of his car
and struck both women, killing the plaintiff's wife. Id. The California Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he Dillon requirement of "sensory and contemporaneous obser-
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some question as to when the tortious event occurred, 171 and whether
the "event" must be a brief and sudden occurrence rather than a se-
quence or course of t:vents over time.'
7 2
D. General Foreseeable Plaintiff Analysis
The utilization of the Dillon foreseeability factors by many courts as
substantive prerequisites or limitations on recovery has been criticized
by many commentators. 173 As in the case of each of the other recovery
vance of the accident" does not require a visual perception of the im-
pact causing the death or injury. In the matter before us, although [the
plaintiff] did not see [his wife being] struck by defendant's automobile,
he fully perceived the fact that she had been so struck, for he knew her
position an instant before the impact, observed the defendant's vehicle
approach her at a high speed on a collision course, and realized that
defendant's car must have struck her. Clearly, under the circumstances
[the plaintiff] must be deemed a percipient witness to the impact ....
Id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
171. See Polikoffv. Calabro, 209 N.J. Super. 110, 506 A.2d 1284 (1986). In
Polikoff, plaintiff's daughter sustained heart failure in plaintiff's presence as the
result of fluid accumulation in the heart from a catheter which was negligently
misinserted at an earlier time. Id. at 112, 506 A.2d at 1287. The court held that
the plaintiff contemporaneously perceived both the tortious act and the injury to
a loved one, by framing the tortious event as having occurred not when the cath-
eter was misinserted (when the mother was not present), but rather when the
fluid was introduced into the catheter (when the mother was present). Id. at
114-15, 506 A.2d at 1288.
172. Compare Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1985) (mother who witnessed son's medical needs being ignored
over lengthy period of time at youth detention center stated cause of action;
plaintiff must be contemporaneously aware of the 1) tortious nature of the de-
fendant's conduct; 2) injury to a loved one; and 3) causal connection between
these) with Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987)
(widow and children of man who died from asbestos exposure failed to meet
contemporaneous observance factor; denying recovery for "gradual, non-trau-
matic injury"); Frame v. Kothari, 218 N.J. Super. 537, 528 A.2d 86 (contempora-
neous observance factor not met where physician misdiagnosed plaintiffs' son's
cerebral hemmorage in their presence; such misdiagnosis was not an "inci-
dent"), cert. granted, 109 N.J. 45, 532 A.2d 1111 (1987).
173. See generally Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery For Psychic In-
jury, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 333, 336-40 (1984) (advocating full recovery for emo-
tional injury without restrictive limiting factors); Diamond, Dillon v. Legg
Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangi-
ble Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 483-93 (1984) (criticizing Dillon as yet another
arbitrary limiting device; advocating compensation only for economic loss stem-
ming from emotional injury); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 583, 606-09 (1982)
(criticizing use of Dillon factors as threshold limitations on recovery); Comment,
supra note 15, at 571; Comment, Foreseeability, supra note 7, at 316-17 (failure to
meet Dillon criteria spells disaster for complainant); Note, supra note 2, at 857-62
(criticizing use of Dillon factors as substantive prerequisites for recovery). But see
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (irrelevant
whether Dillon factors regarded as policy limitations or factors bearing on deter-
mination of foreseeability); Pearson, supra note 49, at 490-501 (arbitrary restric-
tions on recovery necessary for competing policy reasons).
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requirements, 174 the Dillon criteria are frequently both over- and under-
inclusive, allowing recovery where the objective nature of the stress is
slight, or, more typically, denying recovery for severe and foreseeable
psychic distress. 17 5 In short, the Dillon court's "promise" that its factors
would serve as guidelines to be evaluated "on a case-by-case basis, ana-
lyzing all the circumstances" 176 has not been realized.17 7
In California, the original Dillon jurisdiction, the California
Supreme Court has limited the application of the Dillon factors to cases
involving a paradigmatic bystander situation. 178 In Molien v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospitals,179 the plaintiff's wife was negligently misdiagnosed by
the defendants as having syphilis.180 As a result of the misdiagnosis, she
suspected her husband of having engaged in extramarital affairs, and the
subsequent tension and hostility led to a break-up of the marriage.' 8 '
The court held that where the concern for unlimited liability, which is
present in typical bystander actions,18 2 is not presented by the facts,
174. For criticisms of the physical impact rule, see supra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text. For criticisms of the physical manifestation requirement,
see supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. For criticisms of the zone of
danger requirement, see supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1985) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing courts' usage
of Dillon factors as substantive prerequisites for recovery and illustrating this
objection by reviewing many cases denying recovery for severe mental distress).
176. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The
Dillon court was quite clear that it did not consider the factors to be minimum
requirements for recovery. "We are not now called upon to decide whether, in
the absence or reduced weight of some of the factors, we would conclude that
the accident and injury were not foreseeable." Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 81.
177. "What has followed in Dillon's wake is confusion rather than clarity.
The Dillon guidelines have been strictly and mechanically applied. This has led
to arbitrary, inconsistent and inequitable results antithetical to principles enun-
ciated in Dillon." Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 182, 703 P.2d 1, 17,
216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 676-77 (1985) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
178. As ChiefJustice Bird has noted: "[I]f a plaintiff is a 'direct victim' [of
the defendant's conduct] then a 'pure' foreseeability test applies to determine
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, if the plaintiff is
a 'bystander,' the three Dillon criteria are invoked." Id. at 189, 703 P.2d at 22,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
179. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). For further
discussion of the Molien decision, see McCarthy, supra note 9, at 40-43; Com-
ment, supra note 2.
180. 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
181. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
182. This case did not present a typical bystander situation because,
although the defendants' actions were primarily directed at the plaintiff's wife,
the plaintiff's distress did not result solely from concern for his wife's safety, but
also for his own well-being in his marriage. Further, the defendants had in-
structed the plaintiff's wife to advise her husband that she tested positive for
venereal disease, and thereafter performed tests on the husband in order to de-
tect the presence of the disease. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
832. As a result, the defendants' actions could be said to have been "directed
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then Dillon is not controlling. 183 Rather, recovery is available to 1) a
reasonably foreseeable plaintiff 2) who sustains serious psychic in-
jury.' 8 4 Where the conduct of the defendant is directed at the plaintiff,
the risk of harm to him or her is reasonably foreseeable. 185
Molien's requirement of a foreseeable plaintiff who suffers serious
and objectively verifiable distress has been adopted by several jurisdic-
tions for all negligent infliction of mental distress actions.' 8 6 For exam-
at" the husband as well as at the wife. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 835.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. "Serious" distress
would be established where the proof was of a medically significant nature, or
where there was some guarantee of genuineness from the circumstances of the
case. Id.
185. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. Several courts and
commentators have noted that the "direct victim" test is merely reasonable fore-
seeability "in disguise." See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 173, at 603; Note, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, 13 PACIFIC L.J. 179, 189 (1981).
186. Alaska: See Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987) (employing
traditional foreseeable plaintiff analysis). For further discussion of Croft, see in-
fra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
Connecticut: See Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 513 A.2d
66 (1986) (employee discharged after wrongful accusation of stealing funds
failed to state cause of action because conduct of defendant did not foreseeably
risk emotional distress which might result in bodily illness to plaintiff); Mon-
tinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978)
(husband and wife held hostage by gunman who received address from directory
assistance stated cause of action against phone company; requiring that defend-
ant should have realized that conduct involved unreasonable risk of emotional
distress, and that such distress might result in illness or bodily injury).
Hawaii: See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557, 632 P.2d
1066 (1981); Kelly v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673
(1975); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). For further discussion of Leong, with
regard to placing the emphasis of the analysis on the foreseeability of emotional
injury, as opposed to the foreseeability of harm to the particular plaintiff, see
infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
Kansas: See Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984) (attor-
ney's failure to obtain continuance, resulting in defendant's arrest, did not con-
stitute actionable conduct for negligent infliction of mental distress absent
physical manifestation of distress); Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center,
233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 (1983) (parents who were mistakenly informed
that daughter had died must also allege that emotional distress resulted in im-
mediate physical injuries).
Louisiana: See Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct.
App. 1982) (woman whose car was run over by tractor trailer stated cause of
action; liability depends on existence of breach of duty and proximate causal
connection between breach and emotional injury).
Missouri: See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (woman who
suffered extreme anxiety after being trapped in elevator stated cause of action;
requiring that 1) defendant reasonably foresee that conduct risks such distress
and 2) emotional distress be "medically diagnosable" and "medically signifi-
cant"); Davis v. Shelton, 710 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (woman who wit-
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pie, in Hunsley v. Giard, 187 the Supreme Court of Washington declined to
follow any of the arbitrary limiting principles generally employed in the
area of negligent infliction of mental distress. 18 8 The court reasoned
that the boundaries of liability would be adequately curtailed by the
traditional method of limiting a defendant's duty to foreseeable plain-
tiffs.18 9 Further, in order to be compensable, emotional suffering would
need to be manifested by objective symptomatology' 90 and must have
been the reaction of a normally constituted individual)19 '
The Hunsley court declined to fashion a per se rule regarding the
availability of bystander recovery, or to fashion specific guidelines for
circumscribing a defendant's liability in such cases. 192 This would nor-
mally be a jury question regarding the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
reaction. 193 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alaska, which had earlier
adopted the Dillon factors, 194 abandoned the contemporaneous obser-
nessed aunt being struck by hit-and-run driver failed to allege sufficiently severe
distress that was medically diagnosable).
Washington: See Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976);
Spurrel v. Bloch, 40 Wash. App. 854, 701 P.2d 529 (1985). For further discus-
sion of Hunsley, see infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
187. 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). In Hunsley, the plaintiff had
been sitting in her living room when she heard a loud crash. Id. at 425, 553 P.2d
at 1097. She rushed to the back porch utility room and discovered her neigh-
bor's Lincoln Continental in the middle of the room. Id. Within an hour after
the collision, the plaintiff began experiencing bodily numbing sensations, and
was later diagnosed as having suffered some stress to the heart with probable
microscopic damage. Id. at 425-26, 553 P.2d at 1097-98.
188. Id. at 434, 553 P.2d at 1102. The court stated that:
the application of the various rules, their exceptions and aberrations,
has led the courts to reach absurd results and created numerous artifi-
cial boundaries .... Rather than add to the already existing confusion
with the formulation of a new rule, we conclude that the wisest ap-
proach is to return to the traditional principles, theories and standards
of tort law. Thus we test the plaintiff's negligence claim against the
established concepts of duty, breach, proximate cause and damage or
injury.
Id.
189. Id. at 435-36, 553 P.2d at 1103.
190. Id. at 436, 553 P.2d at 1103. The court did not have to decide whether
such objective symptomology must include a physical injury, since such an injury
was present in this case. Id. at 433-34, 553 P.2d at 1102.
191. Id. at 436, 553 P.2d at 1103 (citing Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156,
174, 472 P.2d 509, 512 (1970)).
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974)). For
further discussion of this proposition, see infra notes 228-34 and accompanying
text.
194. See Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska
1986) (adopting Dillon factors, but cautioning that these factors were merely
guidelines to be liberally construed in establishing degree of foreseeability of
injury to plaintiff). For a discussion of Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska
1987), which modified Kavorkian by abandoning the Dillon factors as threshold
requirements, see infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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vance factor when it stood in the way of redress for a foreseeable in-
jury. 19 5  Instead, the court applied a traditional foreseeability
analysis. 196
III. PROPOSAL
A. Social Policy Revisited
The series of tests and requirements imposed in the area of negli-
gent infliction of mental distress have been devised in an effort to meet
several social policy concerns. 197 As the courts have faced new and
more compelling fact patterns, the tests have progressed in a linear fash-
ion towards allowing greater degrees of recovery. It is submitted that
the continued confusion and dissatisfaction in this area of law does not
stem from imperfections in the requirements themselves, but rather
from a basic failure to properly identify and clarify the underlying policy
issues which these requirements were intended to address. It is submit-
ted that before a proper legal analysis can be developed, it is necessary
to reframe' 98 the underlying concerns.
1. "Fraudulent" Claims
It is submitted that it is neither necessary nor helpful to view the
term "fraudulent claim" as involving a specific intent to deceive the
courts. Rather, it would be sufficient if this term referred to those in-
stances where inappropriate, excessive or unnecessary recovery was
provided.
Many individuals who bring actions for mental distress are genu-
inely, though wrongly, convinced that the defendant's conduct caused
them emotional discomfort. 199 Although the psychological mechanisms
195. See Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987). In Croft, parents who
were in close proximity to the sexual molestation of their daughter, but who did
not contemporaneously observe the incident, were held to have stated a cause of
action for mental distress. Id. at 791-93. The court held that the parents' dis-
tress was foreseeable because a youth would naturally seek the consolation of
her parents under such circumstances. Id. at 792. The court cited cases which
allowed recovery for the observance of the immediate consequences of the de-
fendant's conduct, but apparently declined to limit its analysis to an interpretive
extension of Dillon. Id. at 791.
196. Id.
197. For a discussion of these social policy concerns, see supra notes 16-18,
42-50 and accompanying text.
198. "Refraining" is a psychotherapeutic technique, in which a seemingly
unsolvable problem is restated in different terms. In the new context, the solu-
tion is available and even self-evident. See Tavantzis, Tavantzis, Brown &
Rohrbaugh, Home-Based Structural Family Therapy for Delinquents at Risk of Placement,
in M. MIRKIN & S. KOMAN, HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENTS AND FAMILY THERAPY 81
(1985).
199. See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
The Payton court stated:
It is in recognition of the tricks that the human mind can play upon
1988]
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underlying this phenomenon are quite varied and complex, at least two
general causative factors are frequently involved. The first is primarily
intrapsychic, while the second results from an interaction between the
individual and the process of litigation.
Certain individuals are extremely passive and dependent, meaning
that they do not see themselves as in control of their lives, but rather
feel controlled by people and circumstances around them. When they
encounter any degree of stress, they are overly ready to retreat to a sick
role, which requires the help of others, because they feel unable to cope
through self-reliance. 20 0 Other individuals are unable to manage the
anger they experience when they are injured or annoyed by others. 20 1
Such excessive feelings and tension may become bottled up, appearing
as anxiety or depression,2 0 2 or may be manifested as excessive rage and
hostility. 20 3 At either extreme, the individual may need to externalize
the blame for these feelings, so that he or she perceives the feelings as
being caused by some outside source, rather than recognize them as
coming predominantly from within. 20 4 While these feelings are con-
scious, or within the person's awareness, the mechanisms creating them
are frequently not conscious, 20 5 and it would be erroneous to say that
the individual was committing a fraud.
There is frequently an interaction between the process of litigation
and the individuals involved.2 0 6 If, as previously suggested, certain indi-
viduals are overly prepared to blame their emotional discomfort on
others, then this will be exacerbated by the process of litigation, which
itself, as much as of the deception that people are capable of perpetrat-
ing upon one another, that we continue to rely upon traditional indicia
of harm to provide objective evidence that a plaintiff actually has suf-
fered emotional distress.
Id. at 547, 437 N.E.2d at 175.
200. See Singer, Psychological and Forensic Considerations in the Treatment of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorders, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 5 (1983); see also
DSM-III-R, supra note 28, at 353-54 (diagnostic criteria for "Dependent Person-
ality Disorder").
201. See Singer, supra note 200, at 5.
202. See id. at 6.
203. See id. at 5.
204. See Titchener, Post-Traumatic Decline: A Consequence of Unresolved Destruc-
tive Drives, in C. FIGLEY, 2 TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 5 (1986). Titchener notes that
the sense of disorganization and helplessness which follows an unexpected trau-
matic event may overload the individual. Id. at 16. Unable to deal with these
strong aggressive feelings, the individual may unconsciously "project" this sense
of helplessness onto others, "deny" experiencing these feelings, or "exter-
nalize" responsibility for these feelings onto the environment or others. Id.
205. See C. BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 79-96
(revised ed. 1974) (discussion of the various "defense mechanisms" and their
unconscious or semi-conscious nature).
206. See MELTON, PETRILA, POvTHRESS & SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALU-
ATIONS FOR THE COURTS 283 (1987) (participation in legal process may exacer-
bate certain personal traits of the claimant).
818 [Vol. 33: p. 781
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [1988], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss5/3
1988] COMMENT 819
focusses exclusively on the effects of the defendant's conduct. 20 7 Again,
it would be too simplistic to conclude that the plaintiff, plaintiff's attor-
ney or plaintiff's expert have conspired to extract undeserved compen-
sation. The adversarial, team approach of litigation often subtly
influences individuals to emphasize certain facts or experiences, while
deemphasizing others. 20 8
2. Unlimited Liability and the "Floodgates of Litigation"
The other policy issues underlying the legal requirements in actions
for negligent infliction of mental distress are a concern for placing an
unfair and disproportionate burden of liability on defendants, and over-
burdening judicial resources in administering these claims. It is submit-
ted, however, that these concerns are not, in fact, different from the
concern for the successful prosecution of "fraudulent" actions. If recov-
ery is limited to instances where it would be generally viewed as appro-
priate and not excessive, then, by definition, the defendant's liability is
commensurate with the damage that the defendant's conduct caused.
Further, the judicial system would not be overburdened by administer-
ing fair and proper claims.
The risk of unlimited liability is equally present in the context of
extensive recovery to one individual who meets the threshold duty re-
quirements, as to graded degrees of recovery to many individuals in, for
example, bystander actions. Although this Comment has dealt predomi-
nantly with legal standards which have limited recovery unnecessarily,
the flipside of this is also apparent. Courts facing claims which have met
the threshold duty requirements have sustained these actions on
noncompelling facts, or have been inconsistent in devising a myriad of
subsidiary rules and standards so as to limit actual recovery and reach a
207. See Singer, supra note 200, at 9.
208. See Platt & Husband, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Forensic Practice, 4
AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 29, 35 (1986). These authors describe this phe-
nomenon, which they term "role enactment," as a process in which the litigant
picks up subtle clues from the attorneys or treating professionals as to the symp-
toms they might be expected to have. Id. The questions and messages commu-
nicated by the professionals may have the effect of covertly influencing the
litigant to report additional symptoms, or may reinforce the degree and severity
of existing symptoms. Id. This process may be conscious or unconscious. Id.;
see also Simon & Zusman, The Effect of Contextual Factors on Psychiatrists' Perception of
Illness: A Case Study, 24 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 186 (June 1983). These au-
thors discovered empirically that mental health experts' diagnostic and prognos-
tic decisions correlated highly with the practitioner's forensic position (whether
the expert worked for the plaintiff or defendant). Id. at 191. The authors postu-
late that this phenomenon is not the result of a conscious decision on the part of
the experts, but rather is the result of a process termed "situational adjust-
ment," in which the expert becomes unconsciously "forensically engaged" or
allied with his or her "side." Id. at 194; see also MELTON, PETRILA, POYTHRESS &
SLOBOGIN, supra note 206, at 282 (suggesting that clinicians carefully examine
their own biases regarding the propriety of compensating mental injury).
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just result. 20 9 Once the "foreseeable plaintiff" element is established,
many courts have blindly applied "foreseeable injury" and cause-in-fact
principles from other areas of law with little cogent analysis.
One obvious example of this is the application of the so-called "thin
skull" rule, which renders any peculiar vulnerability or predisposition
on the part of the plaintiff a priori foreseeable by the defendant. 21 0 In
Stoleson v. United States,2 11 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently had occasion to confront the thin skull rule
head on. In Stoleson, the plaintiff had experienced alternate expansion
and contraction of her coronary arteries as the result of exposure to ni-
troglycerin in an ammunitions plant. 2 12 Although the plaintiff exper-
ienced no lasting medical damage as a result of this exposure, she
continued to experience characteristic chest pains and related symp-
toms.2i 3 All of the experts who testified were in agreement that the
plaintiff suffered from a "hypochondriacal neurosis," although there was
disagreement about when this condition began.2 i 4 The court cited the
thin skull rule in holding that it would be irrelevant whether the expo-
sure to the nitroglycerin caused the onset of a hypochondriacal illness,
or whether it merely precipitated the onset of hypochondriacal symp-
toms in a predisposed individual.2 15
209. The Dillon court anticipated such an improper application of its guide-
lines: "In future cases the courts will draw lines of demarcation upon facts more
subtle than the compelling ones.., before us." 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 81 (emphasis added).
210. This rule is named for the following hypothetical: If A. hits B. lightly
on the head as the result of a legally culpable act, and B. is unexpectedly injured
because his skull is unnaturally thin, A. remains liable for those unforeseeable
damages. Hence, A. is held to "take his victim as he finds him." See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 261 (4th Ed. 1971).
The applicability of this rule to actions for psychic damages was contem-
plated by the early court decisions which extended liability in this area. See
Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 683, 44 P. 320, 324 (1896)
("[w]hoever might sustain injury by such [a culpable] act would be entitled to
recover to the full extent of his injury, irrespective of his previous physical con-
dition or susceptibility to harm."); Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679
(1901) ("[Ilt is no answer to the sufferer's claim for damages that he would have
suffered less injury ... if he had not had an unusually thin skull .. ").
The social policy underlying the thin skull rule is that, without it, victims
would be systematically undercompensated, since victims with above-average in-
juries would get reduced damages, and victims with below-average injuries
would not get an off-setting increase. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
773 F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1602 (1987).
211. 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the Stoleson deci-
sion, see TIME, July 12, 1971 at 41.
212. 708 F.2d at 1219-20.
213. Id. at 1220.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1220-22. Further, the court held that the defendant would still
be liable even if the symptoms were triggered by the plaintiff's physician's incor-
rect exaggeration of the state of her organic impairment. Id. at 1221 (citing
Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 471, 93 N.W.2d 455, 459 (1958), overruled, But-
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The court sustained this action on duty grounds because the plain-
tiff was physically impacted, and she suffered a physical manifestation of
her mental distress. Once a foreseeable plaintiff was established, the
court mechanically applied a per se foreseeable injury rule. However,
the court subsequently fashioned several alternative methods to defeat
or limit recovery on the grounds of factual cause or damages. While not
going so far as to require proof of hypochondriasis by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, the court advised district judges to "approach such claims
with the healthy skepticism necessary to prevent excessive and un-
founded damage awards, bearing in mind that there is not much diffi-
culty in finding a medical expert witness to testify to virtually any theory
of medical causation short of the fantastic." 2 16
The Stoleson court also noted that any damages would need to be
adjusted downward for the possibility that the plaintiff's pre-existing
condition would have resulted in harm to her even in the absence of
culpable conduct by the defendant.2 17 Finally, the court held that the
plaintiff's claim could have been barred on the ground of "remoteness
of damage," although by its own admission, the court was not clear ex-
actly what the state supreme court had in mind when it developed this
concept. 21 8
Subsequent to its Stoleson decision, the Seventh Circuit again uti-
zow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d '281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971); But-
zow, 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349).
Whether hypochondriasis exists as an intrapsychic syndrome, as opposed to
solely a manifest symptom, and whether it can be caused by traumatic exposure
to an external event late in life, is the subject of much debate in psychology.
Compare C. WENAR, M. HANDLON & A. GARNER, ORIGINS OF PSYCHOSOMATIC &
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES (1962) (faulty caretaking by mother in early infancy is
common denominator in all psychosomatic disorders) and McCranie, Hypochon-
driacal Neurosis, 20 PSYCHOSOMATICS 11 (1979) (the somatic symptom serves as a
symbolic representation of low self-esteem stemming from early life need-frus-
trations which are subsequently ingrained in the personality) with M. SELIGMAN,
HELPLESSNESS (1975) (inability to control environmental contingencies de-
creases motivation and causes emotional and psychophysiological disturbances).
216. 708 F.2d at 1222. This "healthy skepticism" contrasts with other
court opinions expressing confidence in the advancements in the behavioral sci-
ences. For further discussion of this proposition, see supra notes 47-48, 117 and
accompanying text.
217. Id. at 1223-24. In short, her skull was so thin that it would likely have
"cracked" sooner or later due to some unrelated daily occurrence.
218. Id. at 1224. This "remoteness of damage" rationale was originally es-
poused by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 63
Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974). In Howard, the plaintiff developed an irra-
tional fear of contracting cancer as the result of the negligent insertion of a cath-
eter into her shoulder. Id. at 516-17, 217 N.W.2d at 384. The court held that
this fear was so out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor, that, as a
matter of public policy, the defendant was not to be held liable for the damages.
Id. at 519, 217 N.W.2d at 385. Notably, the court viewed this approach as an
individuated response to a particular fact pattern, and made no effort to explain
conceptually whether the limitation stemmed from a consideration of duty,
cause or damages. See id. at 523a, 217 N.W.2d at 388 (Hansen, J., concurring)
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lized the principle of damage mitigation when there was a significant
likelihood that the plaintiff's mental distress would have been precipi-
tated by an event unrelated to the defendant's conduct. In Lancaster v.
Norfolk & Western Railway,2 19 a worker brought an action for negligent
infliction of mental distress against the railway with which he was em-
ployed. The plaintiff had been threatened with a broomstick by one su-
pervisor, "goosed" and sexually assaulted by another, and almost hit
with a sledgehammer by a third. When he was threatened with a pickaxe
handle by yet a fourth supervisor, the plaintiff became schizophrenic. 2 20
The jury returned a finding that the tortious actions of the supervisors
precipitated a latent schizophrenic personality in the plaintiff.22 1 Yet,
citing Stoleson, the court noted that the plaintiff's damages must be re-
duced to reflect the likelihood that he would have become schizophrenic
anyway from a nonliable cause.2 22 However, presumably due to the vul-
garity and severity of the stressor, the court managed to prevent an ac-
tual mitigation of damages by asserting that while the district court did
not instruct the jury on this issue, the jury was "at least apprised of the
issue" through the arguments of counsel and the testimony of the de-
fense expert.223
The damage mitigation analysis has also been employed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.22 4 That court
expressly left the task of appraising the relative contributions of the de-
fendant's conduct and the plaintiff's predisposition to the discretion of
the fact-finder, unencumbered by legal restrictions. 22 5
Finally, in an effort to limit uncomfortable results stemming from
the application of the "thin skull rule," some courts have distinguished
between a physical susceptibility to negative emotions (which would be
compensable) and a susceptibility to the negative emotion itself (which
would not be compensable). 22 6
Clearly, there have been discernible efforts to limit liability for
(suggesting that this response should reflect a proximate cause limitation based
upon unforeseeable injury).
219. 773 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1602 (1987).
220. Id. at 811-12. One might wonder what took him so long!
221. Id. at 812.
222. Id. at 822.
223. Id. at 823.
224. See Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (schizo-
phrenia precipitated by minor car accident held compensable, although defend-
ants were entitled to establish probability that plaintiff would have developed
psychosis in any event).
225. The Second Circuit stated: "It is no answer that exact prediction of
[the plaintiff's] future apart from the accident is difficult or even impossible.
However taxing such a problem may be for men who have devoted their lives to
psychiatry, it is one for which a jury is ideally suited." Id. at 1174.
226. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Gilmore, 57 N.C. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 790, 793
(1982) (distinguishing heart attack resulting from physical susceptibility to fright
(compensable) with unreasonable fear (noncompensable)).
[Vol. 33: p. 781
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mental distress on common-sense grounds even when legal duty re-
quirements have been met. However, this effort has by no means been
consistent or predictable. 227
B. The Foreseeable Injury: A Shift in Focus
Those states following the expanded Dillon and general foreseeabil-
ity analyses have primarily focused on an analysis of legal duty (i.e.,
whether the particular plaintiff was foreseeably affected). However, to
suggest, for example, that familial nonbystanders are not foreseeably af-
fected by injury to a loved one is at best artificial, and at worst ab-
surd.2 28 What may not be foreseeable, however, is the nature and scope
of the plaintiff's emotional injury. In short, the concept of foreseeability
in emotional distress actions has often been confused by the courts' fu-
sion of the duty and proximate cause analyses.2 2 9
227. See, e.g., Jacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So. 2d 843, 846(La. 1983) (plaintiff suffering from anxiety neurosis stemming from car accident
did not fail to mitigate damages by not seeking treatment because no evidence
that further treatment would have been effective or financially possible); Pe-
nouilh v. Crain, 396 So. 2d 947 (La. Ct. App.) (involutional melancholia held
precipitated by car accident despite evidence of premorbid history of interper-
sonal difficulties), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d (1980); Richman v. City of Berkley
Dept. of Pub. Works, 84 Mich. App. 258, 269 N.W.2d 555 (1978) (accident pre-
vented plaintiff from utilizing "active lifestyle as a defense mechanism to combat
her depression").
An interesting case in a similar vein is Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d
379 (7th Cir. 1964). In Thomas, the plaintiff suffered physical injury when a gov-
ernment mail truck was negligently driven into her automobile. Id. at 380. The
plaintiff had been hospitalized for six months for a "psychoneurotic reaction,
depressive reaction" three years prior to the accident, but her treatment had
been successful in that she had subsequently performed well at her job and in
her capacity as a mother. Id. The district court had allowed only nominal dam-
ages for the element of pain and suffering on the ground that, because of the
plaintiff's mental illness which was aroused by the injury, she had received a
"certain gratification." Id. In other words, the court concluded that the acci-
dent aroused a hypochondriacal illness which provided for the plaintiff an ex-
cuse for her basic problems of anxiety and insecurity. See id. at 380 n.3. The
Seventh Circuit reversed and increased the damage award, citing the thin skull
rule in holding that an offset for gratification was inappropriate. Id. at 381. The
appellate court had apparently misunderstood the term "gratification" (a psy-
chological term of art), by equating it with "enjoyment." Id. at 380 n.4 . Rather,
the term refers to intrapsychic instinctual need gratification, and suggests that
the plaintiff was prepared to choose any readily available reality stimulus in or-
der to retreat to the sick role. See Singer, supra note 200, and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 173, at 489 ("It has not been shown, and
it is not self-evident, that proximity to the accident necessarily determines the
severity of psychological trauma."); Teff, supra note 148 (asserting that victim's
relationship to plaintiff should be primary factor in determining foreseeability of
injury to bystander).
229. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (Dillon
factors should not be utilized to bar recovery, but should at most indicate degree
of mental distress suffered); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096
(1976) (required degree of relationship between plaintiff and victim is jury ques-
tion regarding reasonableness of plaintiff's reaction to event).
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In Leong v. Takasaki,2 30 the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the
Dillon factors as a test of legal duty. 23 ' Rather, the court held that these
factors should be indicative of "the degree of mental distress suffered"
by the plaintiff.23 2 The court stated: "[W]hen it is reasonably foresee-
able that a reasonable plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be able
to cope with the mental stress engendered by such circumstances, the
trial court should conclude that defendant's conduct is the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury and impose liability .... ,"233 In short, such factors as
familial relatedness or contemporaneous observance of the accident
contribute to the objective foreseeability that the plaintiff will be seriously
distressed as opposed to merely affected as a threshold matter.
The Leong analysis is premised on the notion that the policy con-
cerns of unlimited liability and fraudulent claims can be appropriately
limited by an objective assessment of the traumatic event and its reason-
ably expectable effects on a normally constituted individual. This ra-
tionale has been expressly adopted by many courts, 23 4 although the
resulting foreseeability standards have not followed from the premise.
C. Describing and Quantifying Foreseeable Injury: An Analysis of Objective
Versus Subjective Indices of Distress
If defendants are held liable for injuries sustained by foreseeable
plaintiffs, then such liability is not unlimited, but rather is contained by
traditional negligence principles. Further, if injury must be objectively
reasonable, then "fraudulent" claims and unlimited liability will be rea-
sonably averted. This two-pronged analysis has been approximated by
some courts and commentators in advocating for a standard which re-
quires 1) a foreseeable plaintiff and 2) resulting serious mental dis-
tress.2 3 5 What is missing from this analysis, however, is an objective
230. 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
231. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765-66.
232. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 766.
233. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765 (emphasis added). For further discussion
and criticism of the "foreseeable harm" analysis, see generally Note, supra note
2, at 864-66.
234. See, e.g., Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746, 441 P.2d 912, 924, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 84 (1968) ("The driver of a car ... is entitled to assume that the ordinary
frequenter of the streets has sufficient fortitude to endure such incidents as may
from time to time be expected to occur... and is not to be considered negligent
towards one who does not possess the customary phlegm.") (citation omitted);
Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (Leong objective requirement of
serious mental distress to normally constituted individual is reasonable response
to fears of unlimited liability); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 653, 338
A.2d 524, 529 (1975) ("Certainly the law should not compensate for every mi-
nor psychic shock incurred in the course of daily living; it should not reinforce
the neurotic patterns of our society.").
235. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (advocating a foreseeable plaintiff/serious injury analysis);
Nolin & Ursin, supra note 173, at 609-19 (same). For further discussion of
Molien, see supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
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causal link between the defendant's impact on the plaintiff and the re-
sulting severe injury.
For example, if the plaintiff is involved in a minor automobile acci-
dent due to the defendant's negligence, and the plaintiff experiences mi-
nor anxiety for a few days as a result, the claim would presumably be
barred as involving nonserious injury. 2 36 In contrast, if the plaintiff de-
veloped a debilitating anxiety neurosis, then the injury would be serious
and recovery available. However, this would violate common-sense no-
tions of factual causation.23 7
In essence, there are two broad causal agents involved: the envi-
ronmental precipitant and the individual's lifelong character develop-
ment or personality. 2 38 If the latter is a predominant cause of the
subjective psychic distress an individual experiences, then the individual
has a "thin skull." And if the environmental event triggers an intra-
psychic process in this individual which yields subjective discomfort,
then the event is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition (or "but-for")
for the distress. When the character structure is such that nearly any
event could trigger subjective discomfort, then, in essence, the trigger-
ing event was not even necessary.2 3 9 And where the character structure
236. For an interesting debate on the pros and cons of allowing redress for
"trivial" or "insignificant" psychic injury, compare Bell, supra note 173, at 382-
91 and Bell, Reply to a Generous Critic, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 437, 442-45 (1984) with
Pearson, supra note 49, at 426-31.
237. Clearly, models of causation have plagued the legal system as a practi-
cal and philosophical matter for centuries. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Causation
in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 109-11 (1983) (con-
cluding that causation in tort law is undefinable and should therefore be based
solely upon considerations of economic efficiency). However, this problem typi-
cally stems from competing policy issues. In the case of the individual develop-
ing a debilitating psychic injury from a minor car accident, it is arguable, from a
psychological perspective, whether the accident in fact "caused" the injury. See
Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 516 A.2d 672 (1986) (Nix, C.J., concur-
ring) (where Dillon factors not met, factual cause of plaintiff's injuries is more
the plaintiff's own emotional makeup than the defendant's conduct); PETRiLA,
PoYTHRESS & SLOBOGIN, supra note 206, at 282 (concept of cause may not make
sense in deterministic psychological paradigm); Sidley, Proximate Cause and Trau-
matic Neurosis, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAw 197 (1983) (same).
238. The relative contributions of environmental and intrapsychic forces in
the development of psychopathology has been fiercely debated in psychology.
However, it is generally agreed that character structure plays at least a signifi-
cant role. See Hendin, Haas, Singer, Gold & Trigos, The Influence of Precombat
Personality on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 24 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 530
(1983) (current work on post-traumatic stress disorder has inappropriately
deemphasized role of preexisting character in determining response to trauma);
see also Modlin, The Trauma in "Traumatic Neurosis, " 24 BULL. OF MENNINGER
CLINIC 49 (1960). Modlin states: " '[T]raumatic neurosis' specifies and overem-
phasizes one factor of stress with resultant understatement of other stresses and
of the individual organism's propensity for breakdown." Id. at 50.
239. Here, some courts will mitigate the defendant's damage liability by the
likelihood of the plaintiff's encountering other triggering events. See supra notes
216-26 and accompanying text.
19881 825
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is such that only a severe environmental insult would cause lasting dis-
comfort, then such an external event would be both necessary and
sufficient. 24
0
The condition of the pre-event character structure can be deter-
mined arithmetically if certain variables are known. For example, if an
individual is extremely upset by an objectively minor event, then it is
said that such individual is "predisposed" to such distress. Conversely,
a minor psychic reaction to an objectively stressful event would lead the
observer to conclude that the individual had a "thick skull." Thus, level
of predisposition (P) can be operationally defined as the difference be-
tween objective stress (0) and subjective impact of event (S): (P-O-S).
Where P is negative, for example, the individual "over-reacted" to the
stimulus, thus implicating at least a partial influence of intrapsychic
forces.
It is precisely that proportion of subjective distress which is ac-
counted for by predisposition or character structure2 4 ' which is unfore-
seeable, in the common understanding of that word, from the
perspective of the defendant. This is, in essence, what the Leong
court 2 4 2 adopted when it held that serious distress to a normally consti-
tuted individual would be foreseeable as a matter of proximate cause. 2 4 3 As
already noted, this concept has been expressly adopted by many courts,
although their resulting foreseeability standards do not follow correctly
240. The relative causal contributions of environmental and intrapsychic
forces may be inferred by a consideration of the objective level of impact of the
exogenous stressor. Where the event is extremely traumatic, the influence of
intrapsychic forces would be expected to play a small role. Conversely, where
the objective nature of the exogenous stressor is slight, the influence of intrap-
sychic forces likely predominates. This may be visually depicted as follows:
Low Objective Stress High Objective Stress
ED influence of external event on functioning
C3 influence of intrapsychic forces on functioning
241. Here, the equation is merely altered arithmetically to be: S=O-P (cul-
pable subjective distress is determined by objective trauma minus character
predisposition).
242. For a discussion of Leong, see supra notes 229-34 and accompanying
text.
243. For a "normally constituted individual," S and 0 would always be
equal since no peculiar predisposition would exist (i.e. P=0). Since all humans
are predisposed to some unique form of psychic discomfort, it is more exact to
say that when P=0, there is no unforeseeable injury from the perspective of the
defendant.
826 [Vol. 33: p. 781
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [1988], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss5/3
from the premise. 24 4
What clearly remains to be considered after quantifying nonforesee-
able injury is to qualify or describe it so that it may be practically admin-
istered by the courts and understood by juries. The Leong court
correctly distinguished between "primary reactions" to a trauma, which
involve the instinctive, autonomic responses of fear, anger, grief and
shock, and "secondary reactions," which result from the individual's
continuing inability to cope adequately with the traumatic event. 2 45 The
former reaction tends to be generalized in the human species, and rela-
tively internalized in expression, 24 6 while the latter varies considerably
among individuals and is more externally verifiable. The secondary re-
actions include, but are not limited to, continuing and debilitating anxi-
ety states, the conversion of uncomfortable feelings and emotions to
physical discomfort, and a hypochondriacal retreat to the sick role. 24 7 It
is the secondary reactions which result in debilitation, significant medi-
cal expenses, lost earnings, etc. The quality, nature and scope of the
secondary reactions depend more upon the unique character of the indi-
vidual, especially when the level of objective stress is relatively slight.24 8
Liability can be limited by holding the defendant responsible for
those secondary reactions which are foreseeable. Foreseeability would
depend upon a finding of fact that the particular secondary reaction
244. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
245. Leong, 55 Haw. at 411-12, 520 P.2d at 766-67.
246. See, e.g., Kolb & Mutalipassi, 12 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 979 (1982).
These researchers found that exposure to trauma-related stimuli induced a gen-
eralized startle reflex pattern followed by fright, aggression or generalized
tremor in victims of combat-related stress syndromes. Id. at 980. The authors
postulated the "existence of an on-going perceptual motor abnormality with re-
gressive impairment.., and fixation through emotional conditioning to a primi-
tive startl-arousal pattern ...... Id. at 985. In short, sights and sounds
simulating those of the original trauma serve as conditioned stimuli to induce
the self-preservation responses of fight, flight or paralysis. The prototype of this
internalized response is believed by these theorists to be the innate startle re-
sponse of infancy. Id.
247. See, e.g., Leong, 55 Haw. at 412, 520 P.2d at 767.
248. The notion that a complex secondary process unique to the particular
developmental history of the individual plays a significant role in the behavioral
outcome of an event is generally accepted by behavioral scientists, although aeti-
ological and phenomenological theories diverge. For example, classical psycho-
analytic theory proposes that reality stimuli may strengthen instinctual impulses
through an associative mechanism. The threatened emergence of these forbid-
den impulses creates a "danger situation" leading to signal anxiety which moti-
vates and strengthens the mediating force of the personality to create a
"compromise" between adversarial forces. See, e.g., C. BRENNER, supra note 205,
at 71-78. In contrast, the inability to control or predict environmental contin-
gencies has been implicated in the development of neurotic symptomology. The
past learning history of the organism would significantly affect the appraisal of
novel and traumatic events. See generally M. SELIGMAN, supra note 215; Mineka &
Kihstrom, Unpredictable and Uncontrollable Events: A New Perspective on Experimental
Neurosis, 87J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 256, 257-59 (1978).
8271988] COMMENT
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would occur in a citizen of ordinary sensibilities. The question would
be, in essence: Could the average person have handled this event with-
out recourse to nonadaptive intrapsychic mechanisms? Or was malad-
aptation a reasonable result of the incident? The emphasis is on the
debilitating secondary reactions because initial autonomic responses are
typically of less significance in determining damages, and are rarely last-
ing in persons of ordinary sensibilities.2 49 Further, it is the secondary
reverberations within the individual which may not be foreseeable.
An interesting way to operationalize foreseeable secondary reac-
tions would be to limit recovery to those cases where the defendant im-
pacted the plaintiff in a manner that "most people do not face with sufficient
frequency or sufficient certainty to anticipate, to prepare for, and thus to ab-
sorb without suffering severe or permanent emotional damage."'2 50 The
only problem with this limiting mechanism is that uniqueness of injury
can occur where the objective nature of the stressor is still slight. For
example, one may be startled by the approach of a pet kangaroo (pre-
sumably a unique experience, at least in this country), but long-term
psychic distress would not be foreseeable. Further, a distinction would
be necessary between events unique in the experience of society in gen-
eral, and those unique to the experience of the plaintiff. Many people
have never been in a car accident, though these are quite common. 25 1
Thus, some combination of uniqueness and objective severity of the
stressor would be required.
The question of what constitutes a common, and thus foreseeable,
secondary response still remains. In-depth longitudinal studies of
trauma victims suggest a predictable and phasic path of recovery, 25 2
wherein the initial autonomic "outcry" 253 is followed by stages of alter-
nating denial 254 and intrusiveness.2 5 5 In very brief summary form,2 56
249. See, e.g., Teff, supra note 148, at 106-07; Comment, Independent Tort,
supra note 7, at 1251-52.
250. Note, supra note 2, at 868 (emphasis added).
251. See Horowitz, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders, 1 BEHAV. SCIENCES & LAW 9
(1983). Horowitz notes that "[s]ome life events are common when their inci-
dence among a population is considered, but are shocking and uncommon ex-
periences for the individual who has for the first time experienced such an
episode." Id. at 18-19.
252. See Horowitz, supra note 251; Lindy, An Outline for the Psychoanalytic Psy-
chotherapy of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, in C. FIGLEY, 2 TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE
195 (1986); Titchener, supra note 204.
253. Horowitz, supra note 251, at 11. This "outcry" may be an expression
of rage, fear or supplication. The outcry is directed at loss, which is the major
component of most serious life events. Id. The loss is of the previous view of
the self in relation to a predictable environment. When that self/environment
relation changes, the opportunity for either qualitative growth or emotional
stagnation exists. See R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF (1982) (all stages of human
growth involve letting go of previous view of self in relation to psychosocial
environment).
254. Horowitz, supra note 251, at 11-12. "Denial" is characterized by psy-
chological numbing, with diminished cognitive information processing and
828 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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post-traumatic event reactions typically follow an alternating path of de-
nial of the impact of the event and intrusive flooding of the memories
and feelings associated with that event. This process is relatively univer-
sal in the human species. 257 The common understanding of this process
is that, following a traumatic event, individuals go through alternating
periods of confusion, grief, fear and rage, on the one hand, and seem-
ingly inappropriate denial or unexpected courage, on the other hand.
This reverberating process may be analogized to the physical action
of a pendulum. 2 58 At one end of the arc is the intrusive reaction, while
at the other end is the denial reaction. The more force that is initially
applied to the pendulum, the further out in both directions it will go,
and the longer it will take to return to rest. Thus, the more objectively
severe the traumatic event, the more severe will be the denial and intru-
sive reactions, and the longer the individual will take to return to status
quo. 259
emoting. Id. at 11. Denial is not necessarily a negative or unhealthy process, but
rather may be an appropriate and adaptive response aimed at providing the indi-
vidual time to integrate the overwhelming novel experience. See Smith, Sealing
Over and Integration: Modes of Resolution in the Post-Traumatic Recovery Process, in C.
FIGLEY, 2 TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 20, 22 (1986).
255. Horowitz, supra note 251, at 12-14. During the "intrusive" stages,
ideas and feelings related to the event flood the individual's conscious aware-
ness. Presumably, these are the thoughts and feelings which were unavailable in
the denial stages. Id. at 12. Poor concentration, hypervigilence, startle reac-
tions, anxiety attacks and reactivation of the fight/flight autonomic response are
common. Id. at 13.
Notably, the current diagnostic criteria for "Post Traumatic Stress Disor-
der" include symptoms of both the denial and intrusive stages. See DSM-III-R,
supra note 28, at 247-51. Characteristic symptoms include recurrent and distres-
sing dreams and recollections of the event, as well as psychogenic amnesia and
efforts to avoid feelings and thoughts associated with the event. Id. at 250.
256. A thorough analysis of the predominant contemporary model of trau-
matic stress theory is well beyond the scope of this paper. It will suffice to sum-
marize it briefly. The memories of a traumatic event, the hypothesized neural
substrate of which are called "engrams," are maintained in active memory stor-
age. Horowitz, supra note 251, at 15. These memory engrams are repeatedly
presented to conscious awareness in an effort to successfully code and store
them in less active form. Id. Since highly novel events do not have a contextual
or semantic core of related memories available in the already existing memory
mass, it is very difficult to use associative mechanisms in order to "file" the new
image. Id. In other words, the individual's view of the world cannot be recon-
ciled with the new information. Id. As a result, the existing cognitive "map" or
"schema" must itself accommodate to the new experience. Id.; see also R. KEGAN,
supra note 253, at 43-45 (process of adaptation involves assimilation of new ex-
periences into old view of world, and accommodation of old view of world to
new experiences) (citing, inter aliaJ. PIAGET, THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN
THE CHILD (2d ed. 1954)).
257. See Horowitz, supra note 251, at 10 (summarizing "relatively universal
tendencies" in stress recovery response cycle).
258. See, e.g., Lindy, supra note 252, at 199.
259. In fact, the individual does not return to his or her previous position.
All experiences change the individual irreversibly. The issue is whether that
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The pendulum analogy is somewhat incomplete, however, since the
human psyche, unlike inanimate objects, does not merely react to exter-
nal pressures, relying solely on friction for resistance. Rather, humans
react to stress through complex, goal-directed behaviors. This process
has been termed "working through" or "meaning-making. ' 260 The de-
nial and intrusion reactions are important tools in the working through
process. By keeping memories of the event out of conscious awareness,
the individual is permitted time and energy to deal with the meaning
and impact of that event. However, if the memories are kept out of con-
sciousness completely, the individual never learns from, or comes to
terms with, the experience. Thus, the intrusion of event-related memo-
ries maintains inner-directed behaviors towards integration.2 6 1
The typical working through process following traumatic events is
understandable and foreseeable from the perspective of the defendant
and the fact-finder since virtually all humans have had to work through
difficult life experiences. 2 62 There is a shared understanding of what
people go through in times of loss or distress. Further, the reasonable
nature and duration of this process can be related to the objective sever-
ity of the stressor itself. The more threatening and novel the experi-
ence, the more difficult it will be to come to terms with. Some events are
so threatening to the integrity of the person that even a normally consti-
tuted individual would be expected to require years of grief and confu-
sion in order to integrate the experience.
However, the working through process can also be slowed down or
prevented under circumstances involving relatively minor objective dis-
tress. 26 3 The traumatic experience may awaken dormant self-images of
incompetence or may remind the individual of earlier traumatic
change will be for the better or worse. See Smith, supra note 254, at 26. Smith
notes: "The choice is either a descent into meaninglessness ...or the slow
reconstruction of a whole new sense of meaning. In fact, this crisis of meaning
can serve as a catalyst to disrupt old patterns, attempt new responses, and chart
a new course." Id.
260. For a discussion of the "working through" process, see Horowitz,
supra note 251, at 14; Lindy, supra note 252, at 197-98.
261. See Lindy, supra note 252, at 198. Lindy states:
Within limits, we assume that the psychic organism is capable of break-
ing down the impact of traumatic stressors and their associated affect
states into manageable amounts that permit gradual intrapsychic
processing. We identify this process as the working through of trauma.
The task requires (1) the recovery of affect-laden memory traces;
(2) the attribution of meaning to these memory traces; and (3) the rees-
tablishment of psychic continuity with the past.
Id.
262. Accommodating to change or loss is inherent in all human growth ex-
periences; from birth, see C. BRENNER, supra note 205, at 71-74 (discussion of
birth and early infancy traumas), to death, see E. KUBLER-Ross, DEATH: THE Fi-
NAL STAGE OF GROWTH (1975) (end of life is but one of many "deaths" that indi-
viduals go through).
263. See Horowitz, supra note 251, at 14-16.
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events.2 64 Further, the individual's intrapsychic capacity for controlling
the length and dosage of the denial and intrusive periods may be inade-
quate. 2 65 Under such circumstances, the individual might experience an
overwhelming influx of traumatic memories, or may keep the entire epi-
sode out of conscious awareness, thus leading to maladaptive avoidance
behaviors. 26 6 Such processes describe what is meant by a character
"predisposition." It is these processes which are unforeseeable from
the perspective of the defendant, and which factually account for a pro-
portion of the subjective distress experienced by the plaintiff. The arith-
metic difference between the length of time and level of grief and
confusion expected during a reasonable working through process, and
that actually required and experienced by the plaintiff, is the proportion
of damages which would be noncompensable under the model proposed
in this Comment.
Support for this model may be found by a consideration of a
number of policy issues. Courts and commentators have been con-
cerned about exposing defendants to potentially unlimited liability, and
allowing the successful litigation of fraudulent claims. However, as
noted earlier, 26 7 liability may be limited in terms of the degree of recov-
ery available to one plaintiff, as well as in terms of the number of poten-
tial plaintiffs. Further, if by "fraudulent claim" it is meant that recovery
is not deemed objectively appropriate, then the analysis proposed here
is a well-suited limiting device.
Another policy issue which has received very little attention in the
literature is how best to compensate plaintiffs. If the goal of tort law is
to place the plaintiff in the same position that he or she would have been
in but for the tortious act,2 68 or to allocate the benefits and burdens
among the parties, then any method or theory of recovery which violates
this purpose would be inappropriate.
The very process of litigation itself, or the judicial sanctioning of
the plaintiff's theory, may exacerbate or stultify the plaintiff's dam-
ages.2 69 In Stoleson,2 70 the Seventh Circuit, in a rare move, addressed
this issue squarely. The court noted that certain persons have a ten-
dency to transform mental distress into debilitating physical symp-
toms, 2 7 1 and that awarding damages to such plaintiffs might "aggravate
264. Id. at 14-15.
265. Id. at 15..
266. See Lewis & Boyd, Symptom Maintenance: An Infrahuman Analysis and Ex-
tension of the Conservation of Anxiety Principle, 88 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 107
(1979) (post-traumatic avoidance behaviors strengthen the anxiety response).
267. See supra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
268. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965) and accompanying
comments.
269. See MELTON, PETRILA, POYTHRESS & SLOBOGIN, supra note 206, at 283.
270. 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Stoleson, see supra
notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
271. Id. at 1222.
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those symptoms and thus make litigation itself a source of illness." 27 2
The court held that the significant expenditure of energy which was re-
quired in order to pursue the lawsuit, and the apparent need to have her
position vindicated by a higher authority, aggravated the plaintiff's
symptoms. 2 73 The court refused to attribute these damages stemming
directly from the lawsuit to the defendant.2 7 4
The potential negative impact of the litigation itself on the trauma
victim's subsequent adaptation is supported by traumatic stress theory.
Perhaps one of the most critical prognostic indicators for post-traumatic
recompensation is the ability of the individual to break down the memo-
ries and associated feelings from the trauma into manageable doses
which may be processed and integrated according to a schedule which
the individual can tolerate. 27 5 Optimally, the alternating periods of de-
nial and intrusion, which follow the impact of the event, will be balanced
in intensity and duration in such a way that neither becomes a long-
term, predominant state. Litigants must face the events surrounding the
trauma on an artificial timetable. As is often the case with victims of
crime, the litigant must discuss and recapitulate the event repeatedly at
the request of others. Further, this typically takes place in unfamiliar
surroundings, in the presence of strangers and in an adversarial
context.
2 7 6
Not only is the individual flooded with the memories of the event,
but the opposite may also occur. The litigation might serve a defensive
function which permits the plaintiff to avoid interpreting the event in a
meaningful manner. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the adver-
sarial mode of litigation, coupled with the necessity for submitting to the
strategies and decisions of the "authority figure" of the attorney, would
maintain feelings of rage and dependency. 2 7
7
The issues raised here are by no means limited to civil litigation for
mental distress. In fact, it is submitted that they permeate some of the
basic assumptions underlying American jurisprudence. To sanction the
notion that emotional, behavioral and cognitive components of a human
being may be significantly and permanently influenced by the conduct of
others, and that this influence should not at least be apportioned in
terms of the degree of responsibility of the individual and his or her
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. The court stated: "It would be strange if stress induced by litigation
could be attributed in law to the tortfeasor. An alleged tortfeasor should have
the right to defend himself in court without thereby multiplying his dam-
ages .. " Id. at 1223.
275. See Horowitz, supra note 251, at 16; Lindy, supra note 252, at 198, 201.
276. See L. EVERSTINE & D. EVERSTINE, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE LAW 36,
44-45 (1986).
277. See Singer, supra note 200, at 9. Singer notes: "In too many circum-
stances, the case drags on and drags the individual down to becoming a chroni-
cally disabled patient." Id.
832 [Vol. 33: p. 781
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surroundings, is to subscribe to a philosophy of determinism which is in
conflict with our judicial system's general assumption of free will. Fur-
ther, it is conflict with the perception of free will and control of oneself
which may be at the heart of psychological health.2 78
Certainly, it is not suggested that the legal process exacerbates
psychic damages in all circumstances, or that the process does not fre-
quently improve the plaintiff's position both financially and emotionally.
For example, the need to regain control and predictability over one's
environment may be met through active efforts to acquire redress. 279 A
judicial sanction of the plaintiff's claim, and a provision for compensa-
tion, might restore a sense that the environment is ultimately fair and
just.28 What is required, then, is a method of generally identifying
those situations where legal redress will likely be beneficial.
It is submitted that where the influence of intrapsychic forces is sub-
stantial or predominant in creating subjective distress in the litigant,
legal redress will be least likely to attain ultimately beneficial results, no
matter how well-intentioned. As noted earlier, clinical observation of
patients who developed post-traumatic syndromes in response to objec-
tively minor events suggests that these individuals were extremely pas-
sive, dependent or unable to handle anger in an adaptive manner prior
to the impact of the event.2 8 1 When the level of objective discomfort is
significantly below that of subjective distress, this premorbid character is
likely playing a determinative role. It is these very aspects of premorbid
style which would be most susceptible to the externalizing, adversarial
and dependence-inducing elements of litigation. 28 2
In short, when subjective discomfort exceeds the objective level of
stress, the individual is most likely to be passive, dependent and angry.
The process of litigation will then be most likely to exacerbate these very
characteristics.
Douglas Bryan Marlowe
278. See, e.g., Fein, How the Insanity Defense Retards Treatment, 8 LAw & HUMAN
BEHAV. 283, 284 (1984) (concluding that individuals who perceive themselves as
free and responsible tend towards higher levels of awareness, initiative, achieve-
ment, independence, complexity and other attributes valued by society) (citing
Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-not yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719 (1973)).
279. See L. EVERSTINE & D. EVERSTINE, supra note 276, at 38.
280. Id. at 45.
281. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
282. See Singer, supra note 200, at 9.
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